Related papers: Positional Injectivity for Innocent Strategies

At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…

Many economic interventions are designed as marginal changes in incentives. Yet in environments shaped by coordination, institutional persistence, and path dependence, such reforms often leave behavior largely unchanged. This paper studies…

Kopczy\'{n}ski (ICALP 2006) conjectured that prefix-independent half-positional winning conditions are closed under finite unions. We refute this conjecture over finite arenas. For that, we introduce a new class of prefix-independent…

We study two-player reachability games on finite graphs. At each state the interaction between the players is concurrent and there is a stochastic Nature. Players also play stochastically. The literature tells us that 1) Player B, who wants…

For normal play, impartial games, we define penults as those positions in which every option results in an immediate win for the other player. We explore the number of tokens in penults of two positional games, Impartial Tic and Impartial…

We study stochastic zero-sum games on graphs, which are prevalent tools to model decision-making in presence of an antagonistic opponent in a random environment. In this setting, an important question is the one of strategy complexity: what…

Mean-payoff games (MPGs) are infinite duration two-player zero-sum games played on weighted graphs. Under the hypothesis of perfect information, they admit memoryless optimal strategies for both players and can be solved in…

We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…

If NONEMPTY has a winning strategy against EMPTY in the Choquet game on a space, the space is said to be a Choquet space. Such a winning strategy allows NONEMPTY to consider the entire finite history of previous moves before making each new…

We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing…

We study 2-player impartial games of the form take-away which produce P-positions (second player winning positions) corresponding to complementary Beatty sequences, given by the continued fractions (1;k,1,k,1,...) and (k+1;k,1,k,1,...). Our…

How do incentive levels affect strategic behaviour? We address this with an experiment that separately identifies own- and opponent-incentive effects in two dominance-solvable games that differ in strategic complexity. Higher own incentives…

We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…

Within the context of video games the notion of perfectly rational agents can be undesirable as it leads to uninteresting situations, where humans face tough adversarial decision makers. Current frameworks for stochastic games and…

Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…

We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which a convex set is approachable in a game with partial monitoring, i.e.\ where players do not observe their opponents' moves but receive random signals. This condition is an extension…

We study players interacting under the veil of ignorance, who have -- coarse -- beliefs represented as subsets of opponents' actions. We analyze when these players follow $\max \min$ or $\max\max$ decision criteria, which we identify with…

We study an evolutionary game of chance in which the probabilities for different outcomes (e.g., heads or tails) depend on the amount wagered on those outcomes. The game is perhaps the simplest possible probabilistic game in which…

We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian…

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…