Related papers: Stabilization of Stackelberg Game-Based Control Sy…
In this paper, we introduce a generalization of the standard Stackelberg Games (SGs) framework: Calibrated Stackelberg Games (CSGs). In CSGs, a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent who (contrary to standard SGs) does not have direct…
In this paper, we study the maximum principle for stochastic optimal control problems of forward-backward stochastic difference systems (FBS{\Delta}Ss) where the uncertainty is modeled by a discrete time, finite state process, rather than…
With the constraint of a no regret follower, will the players in a two-player Stackelberg game still reach Stackelberg equilibrium? We first show when the follower strategy is either reward-average or transform-reward-average, the two…
As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg game: the decision-maker "leads" in the…
A framework is presented for handling a potential loss of observability of a dynamical system in a provably-safe way. Inspired by the fragility of data-driven perception systems used by autonomous vehicles, we formulate the problem that…
We study a stochastic differential game between two players, controlling a forward stochastic Volterra integral equation (FSVIE). Each player has to optimize his own performance functional which includes a backward stochastic differential…
In this paper, we present a family of a control-stopping games which arise naturally in equilibrium-based models of market microstructure, as well as in other models with strategic buyers and sellers. A distinctive feature of this family of…
Function approximation (FA) has been a critical component in solving large zero-sum games. Yet, little attention has been given towards FA in solving \textit{general-sum} extensive-form games, despite them being widely regarded as being…
We investigate a co-design problem, encompassing simultaneous design of system infrastructure and control, through a game-theoretical framework. To this end, we propose the co-design problem as a two-layer hierarchical strategic…
In this paper, we address the inverse problem for linear-quadratic differential non-cooperative games with output-feedback. Given players' stabilizing feedback laws, the goal is to find cost function parameters that lead to a game for which…
This paper is concerned with the stabilization problem of singular fractional order systems with order $\alpha\in(0,2)$. In addition to the sufficient and necessary condition for observer based control, a sufficient and necessary condition…
In this study, we introduce Modular State-based Stackelberg Games (Mod-SbSG), a novel game structure developed for distributed self-learning in modular manufacturing systems. Mod-SbSG enhances cooperative decision-making among self-learning…
Equilibrium refinements are important in extensive-form (i.e., tree-form) games, where they amend weaknesses of the Nash equilibrium concept by requiring sequential rationality and other beneficial properties. One of the most attractive…
Trajectory guidance requires a leader robotic agent to assist a follower robotic agent to cooperatively reach the target destination. However, planning cooperation becomes difficult when the leader serves a family of different followers and…
In shared autonomy, a critical tension arises when an automated assistant must choose between obeying a human's instruction and deliberately overriding it to prevent harm. This safety-critical behavior is known as intelligent disobedience.…
There has been significant recent interest in leader-follower security games, where the leader dominates the decision process with the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy. However, such a leader-follower scheme may become invalid in…
We study the control of rumor propagation in large networked populations by using Stackelberg graphon games. We first introduce a principal who wants to incentivize the spread of her preferred news and discourage the spread of non-preferred…
Mutually beneficial behavior in repeated games can be enforced via the threat of punishment, as enshrined in game theory's well-known "folk theorem." There is a cost, however, to a player for generating these disincentives. In this work, we…
We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…
This paper is concerned with the controller-and-stopper stochastic differential game under a regime switching model in an infinite horizon. The state of the system consists of a number of diffusions \emph{coupled} by a continuous-time…