Related papers: Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actio…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
One of the most appealing aspects of the (coarse) correlated equilibrium concept is that natural dynamics quickly arrive at approximations of such equilibria, even in games with many players. In addition, there exist polynomial-time…
Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…
Strategic uncertainty complicates policy design in coordination games. To rein in strategic uncertainty, the Planner in this paper connects the problem of policy design to that of equilibrium selection. We characterize the subsidy scheme…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning…
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…
We consider turn-based stochastic two-player games with a combination of a parity condition that must hold surely, that is in all possible outcomes, and of a parity condition that must hold almost-surely, that is with probability 1. The…
Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having…
We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…
Boolean games are an expressive and natural formalism through which to investigate problems of strategic interaction in multiagent systems. Although they have been widely studied, almost all previous work on Nash equilibria in Boolean games…
We introduce and study the class of semidefinite games, which generalizes bimatrix games and finite $N$-person games, by replacing the simplex of the mixed strategies for each player by a slice of the positive semidefinite cone in the space…
We provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first computational study of extensive-form adversarial team games. These games are sequential, zero-sum games in which a team of players, sharing the same utility function, faces an adversary.…
In an inverse game problem, one needs to infer the cost function of the players in a game such that a desired joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium. We study the inverse game problem for a class of multiplayer matrix games, where the cost…
We study the computational complexity of decision problems about Nash equilibria in $m$-player games. Several such problems have recently been shown to be computationally equivalent to the decision problem for the existential theory of the…
This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, which are succinctly represented many-player games defined by an interaction graph between the players. In a recent breakthrough, Rubinstein showed…
We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in turn-based stochastic multiplayer games with omega-regular objectives. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval…
Motivated by the sequence form formulation of Koller et al. (GEB'96), this paper defines {\em bilinear games}, and proposes efficient algorithms for its rank based subclasses. Bilinear games are two-player non-cooperative single-shot games…
We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…