Related papers: Efficiency and Stability in Euclidean Network Desi…
We study an NP-hard problem motivated by energy-efficiently maintaining the connectivity of a symmetric wireless communication network: Given an edge-weighted $n$-vertex graph, find a connected spanning subgraph of minimum cost, where the…
Designing optimal interdependent networks is important for the robustness and efficiency of national critical infrastructures. Here, we establish a two-person game-theoretic model in which two network designers choose to maximize the global…
We study a network extension to the Nash bargaining game, as introduced by Kleinberg and Tardos (STOC'08), where the set of players corresponds to vertices in a graph $G=(V,E)$ and each edge $ij\in E$ represents a possible deal between…
We study augmenting a plane Euclidean network with a segment, called a shortcut, to minimize the largest distance between any two points along the edges of the resulting network. Problems of this type have received considerable attention…
In signed networks, each edge is labeled as either positive or negative. The edge sign captures the polarity of a relationship. Balance of signed networks is a well-studied property in graph theory. In a balanced (sub)graph, the vertices…
Even though the problem of network topology design is often studied as a "clean-slate" optimization, in practice most service-provider and enterprise networks are designed incrementally over time. This evolutionary process is driven by…
We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…
This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…
In this paper we study quality measures of different solution concepts for the multicast network design game on a ring topology. We recall from the literature a lower bound of 4/3 and prove a matching upper bound for the price of stability,…
We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…
This paper considers optimization problems over networks where agents have individual objectives to meet, or individual parameter vectors to estimate, subject to subspace constraints that require the objectives across the network to lie in…
In this work and the supporting Parts II [2] and III [3], we provide a rather detailed analysis of the stability and performance of asynchronous strategies for solving distributed optimization and adaptation problems over networks. We…
We present and discuss the results of an experimental analysis in the design of Boolean networks by means of genetic algorithms. A population of networks is evolved with the aim of finding a network such that the attractor it reaches is of…
We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given…
We proposed a new criterion \textit{noise-stability}, which revised the classical rigidity theory, for evaluation of MDS algorithms which can truthfully represent the fidelity of global structure reconstruction; then we proved the…
In Nature, the primary goal of any network is to survive. This is less obvious for engineering networks (electric power, gas, water, transportation systems etc.) that are expected to operate under normal conditions most of time. As a…
One of the most important and well-studied settings for network design is edge-connectivity requirements. This encompasses uniform demands such as the Minimum $k$-Edge-Connected Spanning Subgraph problem ($k$-ECSS), as well as nonuniform…
We study network formation with the bilateral link formation rule (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) with $n$ players and link cost $\alpha>0$. After the network is built, an adversary randomly destroys one link according to a certain probability…
This paper aims to maximize algebraic connectivity of networks via topology design under the presence of constraints and an adversary. We are concerned with three problems. First, we formulate the concave maximization topology design…
In this paper, we consider the problem of network design on network games. We study the conditions on the adjacency matrix of the underlying network to design a game such that the Nash equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. We…