Related papers: Nash Equilibria of The Multiplayer Colonel Blotto …
We initiate the study of the natural multiplayer generalization of the classic continuous Colonel Blotto game. The two-player Blotto game, introduced by Borel as a model of resource competition across $n$ simultaneous fronts, has been…
We study the problem of computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum games. Many natural zero-sum games have exponentially many strategies, but highly structured payoffs. For example, in the well-studied Colonel Blotto game (introduced by Borel in…
In the Colonel Blotto game, two players with a fixed budget simultaneously allocate their resources across n battlefields to maximize the aggregate value gained from the battlefields where they have the higher allocation. Despite its…
Competitive resource allocation between adversarial decision makers arises in a wide spectrum of real-world applications such as in communication systems, cyber-physical systems security, as well as financial, political, and electoral…
The Colonel Blotto game, formulated by Emile Borel, involves players allocating limited resources to multiple battlefields simultaneously, with the winner being the one who allocates more resources to each battlefield. Computation of the…
We introduce the Colonel Blotto game with favoritism, an extension of the famous Colonel Blotto game where the winner-determination rule is generalized to include pre-allocations and asymmetry of the players' resources effectiveness on each…
This paper explores the Nash equilibria of a variant of the Colonel Blotto game, which we call the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game. In the Colonel Blotto game, two players simultaneously distribute forces across $n$ battlefields. Within each…
The Colonel Blotto game, introduced by Borel in the 1920s, is often used for modeling various real-life settings, such as elections, lobbying, etc. The game is based on the allocation of limited resources by players to a set of fields. Each…
The Colonel Blotto game, first introduced by Borel in 1921, is a well-studied game theory classic. Two colonels each have a pool of troops that they divide simultaneously among a set of battlefields. The winner of each battlefield is the…
This paper studies a generalized variant of the Colonel Blotto game, referred to as the Colonel Blotto game with costs. Unlike the classic Colonel Blotto game, which imposes the use-it-or-lose-it budget assumption, the Colonel Blotto game…
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
In this paper, we investigate the multiplayer General Lotto game across multiple battlefields, a significant variant of the Colonel Blotto game. In this version, each player employs a probability distribution for resource allocation,…
This paper analyzes the structure of mixed-strategy equilibria for Colonel Blotto games, where the outcome on each battlefield is a polynomial function of the difference between the two players' allocations. This paper severely reduces the…
The Colonel Blotto game is a deeply studied theoretical model for competitive allocation environments including elections, advertising, and ecology. However, the original formulation of Colonel Blotto has had few practical implications due…
We study a class of two-player zero-sum Colonel Blotto games in which, after allocating soldiers across battlefields, players engage in (possibly distinct) normal-form games on each battlefield. Per-battlefield payoffs are parameterized by…
We describe an efficient algorithm to compute solutions for the general two-player Blotto game on n battlefields with heterogeneous values. While explicit constructions for such solutions have been limited to specific, largely symmetric or…
We consider the following Colonel Blotto game between parties $P_1$ and $P_A.$ $P_1$ deploys a non negative number of troops across $J$ battlefields, while $P_A$ chooses $K,$ $K < J,$ battlefields to remove all of $P_1$'s troops from the…
In the Colonel Blotto game, which was initially introduced by Borel in 1921, two colonels simultaneously distribute their troops across different battlefields. The winner of each battlefield is determined independently by a winner-take-all…
This paper provides theoretical bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. We provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the meta-game is an approximate Nash…
Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these…