Related papers: Pareto optimal exchange with indifferent endowment…

We study Pareto efficiency in a pure-exchange economy where agents' preferences are represented by risk-averse monetary utilities. These coincide with law-invariant monetary utilities, and they can be shown to correspond to the class of…

We give parallel and distributed algorithms for the housing allocation problem. In this problem, there is a set of agents and a set of houses. Each agent has a strict preference list for a subset of houses. We need to find a matching such…

Trading large volumes of a financial asset in order driven markets requires the use of algorithmic execution dividing the volume in many transactions in order to minimize costs due to market impact. A proper design of an optimal execution…

We consider a trading marketplace that is populated by traders with diverse trading strategies and objectives. The marketplace allows the suppliers to list their goods and facilitates matching between buyers and sellers. In return, such a…

This paper derives a robust on-line equity trading algorithm that achieves the greatest possible percentage of the final wealth of the best pairs rebalancing rule in hindsight. A pairs rebalancing rule chooses some pair of stocks in the…

This paper considers the ideal gas-like model of trading markets, where each individual is identified as a gas molecule that interacts with others trading in elastic or money-conservative collisions. Traditionally this model introduces…

We develop a single-period model for a large economic agent who trades with market makers at their utility indifference prices. A key role is played by a pair of conjugate saddle functions associated with the description of Pareto optimal…

We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…

Recently, the problem of allocating one resource per agent with initial endowments (house markets) has seen a renewed interest: indeed, while in the domain of strict preferences the Top Trading Cycle algorithm is known to be the only…

We study Pareto optimality in a decentralized peer-to-peer risk-sharing market where agents' preferences are represented by robust distortion risk measures that are not necessarily convex. We obtain a characterization of Pareto-optimal…

We explore the clearing problem in the barter exchange market. The problem, described in the terminology of graph theory, is to find a set of vertex-disjoint, length-restricted cycles that maximize the total weight in a weighted digraph.…

We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative from a finite set of social alternatives. We provide a…

Weighted reciprocity between two agents can be defined as the minimum of sending and receiving value in their bilateral relationship. In financial networks, such reciprocity characterizes the importance of individual banks as both liquidity…

In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions…

A collection of objects, some of which are good and some are bad, is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely…

The sharing of scarce resources among multiple rational agents is one of the classical problems in economics. In exchange economies, which are used to model such situations, agents begin with an initial endowment of resources and exchange…

A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application…

We study the two-agent single-item bilateral trade. Ideally, the trade should happen whenever the buyer's value for the item exceeds the seller's cost. However, the classical result of Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that no mechanism can…

Kidney exchange is a barter market where patients trade willing but medically incompatible donors. These trades occur via cycles, where each patient-donor pair both gives and receives a kidney, and via chains, which begin with an altruistic…

We study the problem of computing maximin share guarantees, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of $n$ agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of a single agent is the best that she can guarantee to herself, if she would…