Related papers: Pareto optimal exchange with indifferent endowment…
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. When the utilities can be negative, the existence and complexity of an allocation that satisfies Pareto optimality and proportionality up to one item (PROP1) is an…
We consider the problem of optimal exchange which can be formulated as a kind of optimal transportation problem. The existence of an optimal solution and a duality theorem for the optimal exchange problem are proved in case of completely…
We study the classic problem of dividing a collection of indivisible resources in a fair and efficient manner among a set of agents having varied preferences. Pareto optimality is a standard notion of economic efficiency, which states that…
In a barter exchange market, agents bring items and seek to exchange their items with one another. Agents may agree to a k-way exchange involving a cycle of k agents. A barter exchange market can be represented by a digraph where the…
We consider the ideal-gas models of trading markets, where each agent is identified with a gas molecule and each trading as an elastic or money-conserving (two-body) collision. Unlike in the ideal gas, we introduce saving propensity…
Considering the sequential clearing of energy and reserves in Europe, enabling inter-area reserve exchange requires optimally allocating inter-area transmission capacities between these two markets. To achieve this, we provide a…
This paper focuses on the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating resources to agents. We consider a specific setting, usually referred to as a housing market, where each agent must receive exactly one resource (and initially owns…
Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequence of exchanges to attain fairness in the form of…
We study the power of price discrimination via an intermediary in bilateral trade, when there is a revenue-maximizing seller selling an item to a buyer with a private value drawn from a prior. Between the seller and the buyer, there is an…
A principal has $m$ identical objects to allocate among a group of $n$ agents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object to an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to $k$ agents,…
We consider two risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of an illiquid indivisible contingent claim in an incomplete semimartingale market environment. Under the assumption that the agents are exponential utility maximizers…
We consider portfolio selection under nonparametric $\alpha$-maxmin ambiguity in the neighbourhood of a reference distribution. We show strict concavity of the portfolio problem under ambiguity aversion. Implied demand functions are…
We have numerically simulated the ideal-gas models of trading markets, where each agent is identified with a gas molecule and each trading as an elastic or money-conserving two-body collision. Unlike in the ideal gas, we introduce…
We study Fisher markets that admit equilibria wherein each good is integrally assigned to some agent. While strong existence and computational guarantees are known for equilibria of Fisher markets with additive valuations, such equilibria,…
In this paper we initiate the study of finding fair and efficient allocations of an indivisible mixed manna: Divide m indivisible items among n agents under the fairness notion of maximin share (MMS) and the efficiency notion of Pareto…
We study the problem of fairly allocating either a set of indivisible goods or a set of mixed divisible and indivisible goods (i.e., mixed goods) to agents with additive utilities, taking the best-of-both-worlds perspective of guaranteeing…
The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness…
We construct a model of an exchange economy in which agents trade assets contingent on an observable signal, the probability of which depends on public opinion. The agents in our model are replaced occasionally and each person updates…
We present an agent-based model of economic exchange in a society composed of two groups, representing two social groups and with different internal protection rules for the poor agents. The goal is to address the emerging wealth…
Consider discrete-time linear distributed averaging dynamics, whereby agents in a network start with uncorrelated and unbiased noisy measurements of a common underlying parameter (state of the world) and iteratively update their estimates…