Related papers: Dynamic Information Sharing and Punishment Strateg…

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…

In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…

We consider the prisoner's dilemma being played repeatedly on a dynamic network, where agents may choose their actions as well as their co-players. This leads to co-evolution of network structure and strategy patterns of the players.…

We study allocation problems without monetary transfers where agents have correlated types, i.e., hold private information about one another. Such peer information is relevant in various settings, including science funding, allocation of…

We consider a two-road dynamic routing game where the state of one of the roads (the "risky road") is stochastic and may change over time. This generates room for experimentation. A central planner may wish to induce some of the (finite…

In dynamic settings each economic agent's choices can be revealing of her private information. This elicitation via the rationalization of observable behavior depends each agent's perception of which payoff-relevant contingencies other…

Distributed estimation that recruits potentially large groups of humans to collect data about a phenomenon of interest has emerged as a paradigm applicable to a broad range of detection and estimation tasks. However, it also presents a…

We propose InfoChess, a symmetric adversarial game that elevates competitive information acquisition to the primary objective. There is no piece capture, removing material incentives that would otherwise confound the role of information.…

Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix…

We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An informed advisor decides how much information to provide to an uninformed decision maker, so as to influence his short-term…

So far, the theory of equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is insensitive to communication possibilities. To address this issue, we incorporate the assumption that communication reduces -- but does not…

This work studies the distributed learning process on a network of agents. Agents make partial observation about an unknown hypothesis and iteratively share their beliefs over a set of possible hypotheses with their neighbors to learn the…

High performance machine learning models have become highly dependent on the availability of large quantity and quality of training data. To achieve this, various central agencies such as the government have suggested for different data…

We present a new model for reasoning about the way information is shared among friends in a social network, and the resulting ways in which it spreads. Our model formalizes the intuition that revealing personal information in social…

Matrix games like Prisoner's Dilemma have guided research on social dilemmas for decades. However, they necessarily treat the choice to cooperate or defect as an atomic action. In real-world social dilemmas these choices are temporally…

The problem of controlling multi-agent systems under different models of information sharing among agents has received significant attention in the recent literature. In this paper, we consider a setup where rather than committing to a…

We analyze in this paper finite horizon hierarchical signaling games between (information provider) senders and (decision maker) receivers in a dynamic environment. The underlying information evolves in time while sender and receiver…

We analyze, both analytically and numerically, the self-organization of a system of "selfish" adaptive agents playing an arbitrary iterated pairwise game (defined by a 2X2 payoff matrix). Examples of possible games to play are: the…

In this paper we describe a decision process framework allowing an agent to decide what information it should reveal to its neighbours within a communication graph in order to maximise its utility. We assume that these neighbours can pass…

In this paper we study the problem of social learning under multiple true hypotheses and self-interested agents which exchange information over a graph. In this setup, each agent receives data that might be generated from a different…