Related papers: Dynamic Information Sharing and Punishment Strateg…
This paper studies information transmission from multiple senders who compete for the attention of a decision maker. Each sender is partially informed about the state of the world and decides how to reveal her information over time to…
We consider a model of nomadic agents exploring and competing for time-varying location-specific resources, arising in crowdsourced transportation services, online communities, and in traditional location based economic activity. This model…
Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have…
This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…
In general-sum games, the interaction of self-interested learning agents commonly leads to socially worse outcomes, such as defect-defect in the iterated stag hunt (ISH). Previous works address this challenge by sharing rewards or shaping…
A wide variety of goals could cause an AI to disable its off switch because "you can't fetch the coffee if you're dead" (Russell 2019). Prior theoretical work on this shutdown problem assumes that humans know everything that AIs do. In…
We study the problem of Bayesian learning in a dynamical system involving strategic agents with asymmetric information. In a series of seminal papers in the literature, this problem has been investigated under a simplifying model where…
Distributed online optimization and game have been increasingly researched in the last decade, mostly motivated by its wide applications in sensor networks, robotics (e.g., distributed target tracking and formation control), smart grids,…
This paper addresses a mathematically tractable model of the Prisoner's Dilemma using the framework of active inference. In this work, we design pairs of Bayesian agents that are tracking the joint game state of their and their opponent's…
As increasingly capable agents are deployed, a central safety challenge is how to retain meaningful human control without modifying the underlying system. We study a minimal control interface in which an agent chooses whether to act…
In many non-cooperative settings, agents often possess useful information that provide an advantage over their opponent(s), but acting on such information too frequently can lead to detection. I develop a simple framework to analyze such a…
Humans do not always make rational choices, a fact that experimental economics is putting on solid grounds. The social context plays an important role in determining our actions, and often we imitate friends or acquaintances without any…
In this work, we are interested in finding the most efficient use of a budget to promote an opinion by paying agents within a group to supplant their true opinions. We model opinions as continuous scalars ranging from 0 to 1 with 1 (0)…
In shared autonomy, a critical tension arises when an automated assistant must choose between obeying a human's instruction and deliberately overriding it to prevent harm. This safety-critical behavior is known as intelligent disobedience.…
We study opinion dynamics in a population of interacting adaptive agents voting on a set of complex multidimensional issues. We consider agents which can classify issues into for or against. The agents arrive at the opinions about each…
An agent, or a coalition of agents, faces an ethical dilemma between several statements if she is forced to make a conscious choice between which of these statements will be true. This paper proposes to capture ethical dilemmas as a…
To make decisions we are guided by the evidence we collect, as well as the opinions of friends and neighbors. How do we integrate our private beliefs with information we obtain from our social network? To understand the strategies humans…
We study the problem of information provision by a strategic central planner who can publicly signal about an uncertain infectious risk parameter. Signalling leads to an updated public belief over the parameter, and agents then make…
This paper addresses information design in a workhorse model of network games, where agents have linear best responses, the information designer maximizes a quadratic objective, and the payoff-relevant state follows a multivariate Gaussian…
Nowadays, both the amount of cyberattacks and their sophistication have considerably increased, and their prevention is of concern of most of organizations. Cooperation by means of information sharing is a promising strategy to address this…