Related papers: Conveying Value via Categories
As performance gains through scaling data and/or model size experience diminishing returns, it is becoming increasingly popular to turn to ensembling, where the predictions of multiple models are combined to improve accuracy. In this paper,…
I study dynamic contracting where Sender privately observes a Markovian state and seeks to motivate Receiver, who acts. Sender provides incentives in two ways: payments, which alter payoffs ex-post, and (Bayesian) persuasion, which shapes…
Metric learning seeks to embed images of objects suchthat class-defined relations are captured by the embeddingspace. However, variability in images is not just due to different depicted object classes, but also depends on other latent…
An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number of mediators, the sender's optimal value is characterized.…
We consider a basic communication and sensing setup comprising a transmitter, a receiver and a sensor. The transmitter sends an encoded sequence to the receiver through a discrete memoryless channel, and the receiver is interested in…
Auction theory traditionally assumes that bidders' valuation distributions are known to the auctioneer, such as in the celebrated, revenue-optimal Myerson auction. However, this theory does not describe how the auctioneer comes to possess…
Assessors make preference judgments faster and more consistently than graded judgments. Preference judgments can also recognize distinctions between items that appear equivalent under graded judgments. Unfortunately, preference judgments…
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a…
Several different fairness notions have been introduced in the context of fair allocation of goods. In this manuscript, we compare between some fairness notions that are used in settings in which agents have arbitrary (perhaps unequal)…
We design a protocol for dynamic prioritization of data on shared routers such as untethered 3G/4G devices. The mechanism prioritizes bandwidth in favor of users with the highest value, and is incentive compatible, so that users can simply…
In many real-world classification problems, the labels of training examples are randomly corrupted. Most previous theoretical work on classification with label noise assumes that the two classes are separable, that the label noise is…
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
I consider the monopolistic pricing of informational good. A buyer's willingness to pay for information is from inferring the unknown payoffs of actions in decision making. A monopolistic seller and the buyer each observes a private signal…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
We fully solve a sorting problem with heterogeneous firms and multiple heterogeneous workers whose skills are imperfect substitutes. We show that optimal sorting, which we call mixed and countermonotonic, is comprised of two regions. In the…
When a new product or technology is introduced, potential consumers can learn its quality by trying the product, at a risk, or by letting others try it and free-riding on the information that they generate. We propose a dynamic game to…
I study multidimensional sequential screening. A monopolist contracts with a buyer who privately observes information about the distribution of their eventual valuations for multiple goods. After initial private information is reported and…
Rankings are the primary interface through which many online platforms match users to items (e.g. news, products, music, video). In these two-sided markets, not only the users draw utility from the rankings, but the rankings also determine…
Selecting an appropriate optimizer for a given problem is of major interest for researchers and practitioners. Many analytical optimizers have been proposed using a variety of theoretical and empirical approaches; however, none can offer a…