Related papers: Competition in Costly Talk
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is a small agent who is more susceptible to the flow of information in the market than the general market participant, and who tries to implement strategies…
We develop a model of content filtering as a game between the filter and the content consumer, where the latter incurs information costs for examining the content. Motivating examples include censoring misinformation, spam/phish filtering,…
We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern. Individuals choose the effort with which they search…
In many real-world applications, a model provider provides probabilistic forecasts to downstream decision-makers who use them to make decisions under diverse payoff objectives. The provider may have access to multiple predictive models,…
A network of agents attempt to learn some unknown state of the world drawn by nature from a finite set. Agents observe private signals conditioned on the true state, and form beliefs about the unknown state accordingly. Each agent may face…
We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable'" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which…
We study a model of competitive information design in an oligopoly search market with heterogeneous consumer search costs. A unique class of equilibria -- upper-censorship equilibria -- emerges under intense competition. In equilibrium,…
We study information disclosure in competitive markets with adverse selection. Sellers privately observe product quality, with higher quality entailing higher production costs, while buyers trade at the market-clearing price after observing…
In this paper we model a game such that all strategies are non-revealing, with imperfect recall and incomplete information. We also introduce a modified sliding-block code as a linear transformation which generates common knowledge of how…
We consider decision-making under incomplete information about an unknown state of nature. We show that a decision problem yields a higher value of information than another, uniformly across information structures, if and only if it is…
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information so as to influence the behavior of self-interested receivers. In the last years, a growing attention has been devoted to relaxing the assumption that…
Democratic societies increasingly rely on communication networks to aggregate citizen preferences and information, yet these same networks can systematically mislead voters under certain conditions. We introduce an agent-based model that…
We study strategic information transmission in a hierarchical setting where information gets transmitted through a chain of agents up to a decision maker whose action is of importance to every agent. This situation could arise whenever an…
As interaction between autonomous agents, communication can be analyzed in game-theoretic terms. Meaning game is proposed to formalize the core of intended communication in which the sender sends a message and the receiver attempts to infer…
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…
We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define…
I consider the monopolistic pricing of informational good. A buyer's willingness to pay for information is from inferring the unknown payoffs of actions in decision making. A monopolistic seller and the buyer each observes a private signal…
Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and…
A sender persuades a strategically naive decisionmaker (DM) by committing privately to an experiment. Sender's choice of experiment is unknown to the DM, who must form her posterior beliefs nonparametrically by applying some learning rule…
We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power: before learning the state, sender designs a strategy, which maps the state into a probability distribution over actions. We provide a geometric…