Related papers: Competition in Costly Talk
We simulate behaviour of two independent reinforcement learning algorithms playing the Crawford and Sobel (1982) game of strategic information transmission. We adopt memoryless algorithms to capture learning in a static game where a large…
Players are statistical learners who learn about payoffs from data. They may interpret the same data differently, but have common knowledge of a class of learning procedures. I propose a metric for the analyst's "confidence" in a strategic…
We study a regime change game in which the state and an opposition leader both observe the regime's true strength and may engage in costly communication by manipulating the mean of citizens' private signals. Each citizen then decides…
This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests…
We consider the issue of multiple agents learning to communicate through reinforcement learning within partially observable environments, with a focus on information asymmetry in the second part of our work. We provide a review of the…
Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…
This paper explores the problem of mediated communication enhanced by money-burning tactics for commitment power. In our model, the sender has state-independent preferences and can design a communication mechanism that both transmits…
We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an unknown state, so no sender can verify another's report. A…
The main approach to evaluating communication is by assessing how well it facilitates coordination. If two or more individuals can coordinate through communication, it is generally assumed that they understand one another. We investigate…
We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores…
This paper examines signalling when the sender exerts effort and receives benefits over time. Receivers only observe a noisy public signal about the effort, which has no intrinsic value. The modelling of signalling in a dynamic context…
This paper presents a model of costly information acquisition where decision-makers can choose whether to elaborate information superficially or precisely. The former action is costless, while the latter entails a processing cost. Within…
Transparency of information disclosure has always been considered an instrumental component of effective governance, accountability, and ethical behavior in any organization or system. However, a natural question follows: \emph{what is the…
This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver's…
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is…
I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…
We study a sender-receiver model in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. The decision rule can depend on the information structure chosen by the sender and the realized…
In an information aggregation game, a set of senders interact with a receiver through a mediator. Each sender observes the state of the world and communicates a message to the mediator, who recommends an action to the receiver based on the…
We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…
Continually arriving information is communicated through a network of $n$ agents, with the value of information to the $j$'th recipient being a decreasing function of $j/n$, and communication costs paid by recipient. Regardless of details…