Related papers: The Effect of Behavioral Probability Weighting in …

We consider a game-theoretic model where individuals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource. We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling the utilization of the resource at the Nash equilibrium…

Classical results of Decision Theory, and its extension to a multi-agent setting: Game Theory, operate only at the associative level of information; this is, classical decision makers only take into account probabilities of events; we go…

Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having…

Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…

In cybersecurity, attackers range from brash, unsophisticated script kiddies and cybercriminals to stealthy, patient advanced persistent threats. When modeling these attackers, we can observe that they demonstrate different risk-seeking and…

We study the security of interaction protocols when incentives of participants are taken into account. We begin by formally defining correctness of a protocol, given a notion of rationality and utilities of participating agents. Based on…

This paper introduces risk-revising players to a class of games with incomplete information. These players enter the game with ex ante risk preferences represented by coherent risk measures and develop time-consistent interim revisions of…

Designing cyber defense systems to account for cognitive biases in human decision making has demonstrated significant success in improving performance against human attackers. However, much of the attention in this area has focused on…

We consider scenarios where a worker robot, who may be unaware of the human's exact expectations, may have the incentive to deviate from a preferred plan (e.g. safe but costly) when a human supervisor is not monitoring it. On the other…

We discuss and solve a model for a game with many players, where a subset of truely deciding players is embedded into a hierarchy of dependent agents. These interdependencies modify the game matrix and the Nash equilibria for the deciding…

We formulate a resource-planning game between an attacker and a defender of a network control system. We consider the network to be operating in closed-loop with a linear quadratic regulator (LQR). We construct a general-sum, two-player,…

Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…

Blotto Games are a popular model of multi-dimensional strategic resource allocation. Two players allocate resources in different battlefields in an auction setting. While competition with equal budgets is well understood, little is known…

Data injection attacks have recently emerged as a significant threat on the smart power grid. By launching data injection attacks, an adversary can manipulate the real-time locational marginal prices to obtain economic benefits. Despite the…

In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. In such a game each player has two types. Either the player is a rational player seeking to…

In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…

In this study, we present models where participants strategically select their risk levels and earn corresponding rewards, mirroring real-world competition across various sectors. Our analysis starts with a normal form game involving two…

We present a network influence game that models players strategically seeding the opinions of nodes embedded in a social network. A social learning dynamic, whereby nodes repeatedly update their opinions to resemble those of their…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

Nash equilibrium is used as a model to explain the observed behavior of players in strategic settings. For example, in many empirical applications we observe player behavior, and the problem is to determine if there exist payoffs for the…