Related papers: The Effect of Behavioral Probability Weighting in …
We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…
We consider a system consisting of multiple interdependent assets, and a set of defenders, each responsible for securing a subset of the assets against an attacker. The interdependencies between the assets are captured by an attack graph,…
We explore a scenario involving two sites and a sequential game between a defender and an attacker, where the defender is responsible for securing the sites while the attacker aims to attack them. Each site holds a loss value for the…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
We study the security of large-scale cyber-physical systems (CPS) consisting of multiple interdependent subsystems, each managed by a different defender. Defenders invest their security budgets with the goal of thwarting the spread of cyber…
The results of a learning process depend on the input data. There are cases in which an adversary can strategically tamper with the input data to affect the outcome of the learning process. While some datasets are difficult to attack, many…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
We introduce a strategic behavior in reinsurance bilateral transactions, where agents choose the risk preferences they will appear to have in the transaction. Within a wide class of risk measures, we identify agents' strategic choices to a…
This study investigates differential games with motion-payoff uncertainty in continuous-time settings. We propose a framework where players update their beliefs about uncertain parameters using continuous Bayesian updating. Theoretical…
Attack detection is usually approached as a classification problem. However, standard classification tools often perform poorly because an adaptive attacker can shape his attacks in response to the algorithm. This has led to the recent…
We consider a game in which a strategic defender classifies an intruder as spy or spammer. The classification is based on the number of file server and mail server attacks observed during a fixed window. The spammer naively attacks (with a…
In this paper, we consider a new network security game wherein an attacker and a defender are battling over "multiple" targets. This type of game is appropriate to model many current network security conflicts such as Internet phishing,…
Attempts at predatory capture may provoke a defensive response that reduces the very value of the predated resource. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of simultaneous-move, two-player Attacker-Defender games that model such interactions.…
This paper examines the impact of cognitive biases on financial decision-making through a static Bayesian game framework. While traditional economic theory assumes fully rational investors, real-world choices are often shaped by loss…
Choosing a hard-to-guess secret is a prerequisite in many security applications. Whether it is a password for user authentication or a secret key for a cryptographic primitive, picking it requires the user to trade-off usability costs with…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
We study a common-pool resource game where the resource experiences failure with a probability that grows with the aggregate investment in the resource. To capture decision making under such uncertainty, we model each player's risk…
The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing…
Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…
This paper investigates the strategic concealment of environment representations used by players in competitive games. We consider a defense scenario in which one player (the Defender) seeks to infer and exploit the representation used by…