Related papers: Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk

A policy maker faces a sequence of unknown outcomes. At each stage two (self-proclaimed) experts provide probabilistic forecasts on the outcome in the next stage. A comparison test is a protocol for the policy maker to (eventually) decide…

Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…

We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information;…

This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…

In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of…

A central question of crowd-sourcing is how to elicit expertise from agents. This is even more difficult when answers cannot be directly verified. A key challenge is that sophisticated agents may strategically withhold effort or information…

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…

An expert tells an advisee whether to take an action that may be good or bad. He may provide a condition under which to take the action. This condition predicts whether the action is good if and only if the expert is competent. Providing…

We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores…

We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider…

In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…

Although many game-theoretic models replicate real interactions that often rely on natural language, explicit study of games where language is central to strategic interaction remains limited. This paper introduces the \emph{conversation…

We give elementary examples within a framework for studying decisions under uncertainty where probabilities are only roughly known. The framework, in gambling terms, is that the size of a bet is proportional to the gambler's perceived…

We outline how to create a mechanism that provides an optimal way to elicit, from an arbitrary group of experts, the probability of the truth of an arbitrary logical proposition together with collective information that has an explicit form…

We investigate how asymmetric information affects equilibrium price formation in an economy with many interacting agents. Motivated by a finite-player model with two populations of asymmetrically informed agents, we study its mean-field…

When deciding how to act under uncertainty, agents may choose to act to reduce uncertainty or they may act despite that uncertainty. In communicative settings, an important way of reducing uncertainty is by asking clarification questions…

Sender-receiver interactions, and specifically persuasion games, are widely researched in economic modeling and artificial intelligence. However, in the classic persuasion games setting, the messages sent from the expert to the…

In this work, we proposed a new $N$-person game in which the players can bet on two options, for example represented by two boxers. Some of the players have privileged information about the boxers and part of them can provide this…

The problem of peer prediction is to elicit information from agents in settings without any objective ground truth against which to score reports. Peer prediction mechanisms seek to exploit correlations between signals to align incentives…

Prediction markets provide an efficient means to assess uncertain quantities from forecasters. Traditional and competitive strictly proper scoring rules have been shown to incentivize players to provide truthful probabilistic forecasts.…