Related papers: Convergence of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in Infini…

Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work, we proposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware…

We study the randomized query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria (ANE) in large games. We prove that, for some constant $\epsilon>0$, any randomized oracle algorithm that computes an $\epsilon$-ANE in a binary-action, $n$-player game…

We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…

For a class of finite horizon first order mean field games and associated N-player games, we give a simple proof of convergence of symmetric N-player Nash equilibria in distributed open-loop strategies to solutions of the mean field game in…

This paper develops a unified framework for testing monotonicity of Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies in unobserved types in games of incomplete information. We show that, under symmetric independent private types, monotonicity of…

Bayesian games model interactive decision-making where players have incomplete information -- e.g., regarding payoffs and private data on players' strategies and preferences -- and must actively reason and update their belief models (with…

We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…

We consider two-player non zero-sum infinite duration games played on weighted graphs. We extend the notion of secure equilibrium introduced by Chatterjee et al., from the Boolean setting to this quantitative setting. As for the Boolean…

We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with large random payoff matrices. By means of an annealed bound, we calculate their number and analyse…

We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…

Distributed optimization and Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems have drawn much attention in the control community recently. This paper studies a class of non-cooperative games, known as N-cluster game, which subsumes both cooperative…

Inspired by the recent work by Shapiro et al. [45], we propose a Bayesian distributionally robust Nash equilibrium (BDRNE) model where each player lacks complete information on the true probability distribution of the underlying uncertainty…

Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we…

We study $n$-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame…

We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria ($\alpha$-PNE) in weighted atomic congestion games with polynomial cost functions of maximum degree $d$. Previously it was known that $d$-approximate equilibria always exist, while…

We consider a finite horizon repeated game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Their actions and types jointly determine their instantaneous rewards. In each period,…

We consider a general class of Bayesian Games where each players utility depends on his type (possibly multidimensional) and on the strategy profile and where players' types are distributed independently. We show that if their full…

We consider a game in which each player must find a compromise between more daring strategies that carry a high risk for him to be eliminated, and more cautious ones that, however, reduce his final score. For two symmetric players this game…

We introduce the notion of regularized Bayesian best response (RBBR) learning dynamic in heterogeneous population games. We obtain such a dynamic via perturbation by an arbitrary lower semicontinuous, strongly convex regularizer in Bayesian…

In dynamic games with shared constraints, Generalized Nash Equilibria (GNE) are often computed using the normalized solution concept, which assumes identical Lagrange multipliers for shared constraints across all players. While widely used,…