Related papers: Two-Sided Matching Markets in the ELLIS 2020 PhD P…
In matching markets such as job posting and online dating platforms, the recommender system plays a critical role in the success of the platform. Unlike standard recommender systems that suggest items to users, reciprocal recommender…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
Many centralized mechanisms for two-sided matching markets that enjoy strong theoretical properties assume that the planner solicits full information on the preferences of each participating agent. In particular, they expect that…
We study a continuous-time, infinite-horizon dynamic bipartite matching problem. Suppliers arrive according to a Poisson process; while waiting, they may abandon the queue at a uniform rate. Customers on the other hand must be matched upon…
Matching problems under uncertainty arise in applications such as kidney exchange, hiring, and online marketplaces. A decision-maker must sequentially explore potential matches under local exploration constraints, while committing…
In this paper we consider the collaborative ranking setting: a pool of users each provides a small number of pairwise preferences between $d$ possible items; from these we need to predict preferences of the users for items they have not yet…
Algorithmic monoculture arises when many decision-makers rely on the same algorithm to evaluate applicants. An emerging body of work investigates possible harms of this kind of homogeneity, but has been limited by the challenge of…
Supervised learning models have been used in various domains such as lending, college admission, face recognition, natural language processing, etc. However, they may inherit pre-existing biases from training data and exhibit discrimination…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
Matching markets face increasing needs to learn the matching qualities between demand and supply for effective design of matching policies. In practice, the matching rewards are high-dimensional due to the growing diversity of participants.…
In this paper, we derive an algorithmic fairness metric from the fairness notion of equal opportunity for equally qualified candidates for recommendation algorithms commonly used by two-sided marketplaces. We borrow from the economic…
We consider a many-to-one matching market where colleges share true preferences over students but make decisions using only independent noisy rankings. Each student has a true value $v$, but each college $c$ ranks the student according to…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit…
The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S) comprises three sets of agents, namely students, projects and lecturers, where students have preferences over projects and lecturers have preferences…
We propose a new fairness notion, motivated by the practical challenge of allocating teaching assistants (TAs) to courses in a department. Each course requires a certain number of TAs and each TA has preferences over the courses they want…
Receiving timely and personalized feedback is essential for second-language learners, especially when human instructors are unavailable. This study explores the effectiveness of Large Language Models (LLMs), including both proprietary and…
In many matching markets, one side "applies" to the other, and these applications are often expensive and time-consuming (e.g. students applying to college). It is tempting to think that making the application process easier should benefit…
We present a polynomial-time $\frac{3}{2}$-approximation algorithm for the problem of finding a maximum-cardinality stable matching in a many-to-many matching model with ties and laminar constraints on both sides. We formulate our problem…