Related papers: Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and con…
This paper examines the convergence behaviour of simultaneous best-response dynamics in random potential games. We provide a theoretical result showing that, for two-player games with sufficiently many actions, the dynamics converge quickly…
Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…
Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in…
In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…
We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…
The paper studies the convergence properties of (continuous) best-response dynamics from game theory. Despite their fundamental role in game theory, best-response dynamics are poorly understood in many games of interest due to the…
We study the convergence time of the best response dynamics in player-specific singleton congestion games. It is well known that this dynamics can cycle, although from every state a short sequence of best responses to a Nash equilibrium…
The class of weakly acyclic games, which includes potential games and dominance-solvable games, captures many practical application domains. In a weakly acyclic game, from any starting state, there is a sequence of better-response moves…
We consider finite two-player normal form games with random payoffs. Player A's payoffs are i.i.d. from a uniform distribution. Given p in [0, 1], for any action profile, player B's payoff coincides with player A's payoff with probability p…
We analyse the typical structure of games in terms of the connectivity properties of their best-response graphs. Our central result shows that, among games that are `generic' (without indifferences) and that have a pure Nash equilibrium,…
If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
In this paper we develop a novel approach to the convergence of Best-Response Dynamics for the family of interference games. Interference games represent the fundamental resource allocation conflict between users of the radio spectrum. In…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
We consider evolutionary games on a population whose underlying topology of interactions is determined by a binomial random graph $G(n,p)$. Our focus is on 2-player symmetric games with 2 strategies played between the incident members of…
Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around their optimum, i.e., Nash equilibrium. When a game…
Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a…
We analyze best response dynamics for finding a Nash equilibrium of an infinite horizon zero-sum stochastic linear quadratic dynamic game (LQDG) with partial and asymmetric information. We derive explicit expressions for each player's best…