Related papers: Binary Mean Field Stochastic Games: Stationary Equ…
We study infinite-horizon Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) with a continuum of heterogeneous agents interacting through a common noise, without assuming exchangeability. We introduce the framework of Conditional Non-Exchangeable Mean Field…
This paper develops a mean field game framework for dynamic two-sided matching markets, extending existing matching theory by integrating micro-macro dynamics in two-sided environments. Unlike traditional matching models focusing on static…
We consider a dynamic traffic routing game over an urban road network involving a large number of drivers in which each driver selecting a particular route is subject to a penalty that is affine in the logarithm of the number of drivers…
We consider a Mean Field Games model where the dynamics of the agents is subdiffusive. According to the optimal control interpretation of the problem, we get a system involving fractional time-derivatives for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and…
We consider discrete-time stationary mean field games (MFG) with unknown dynamics and design algorithms for finding the equilibrium with finite-time complexity guarantees. Prior solutions to the problem assume either the contraction of a…
In this paper, we consider a first-order deterministic mean field game model inspired by crowd motion in which agents moving in a given domain aim to reach a given target set in minimal time. To model interaction between agents, we assume…
In this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with the risk-sensitive optimality criterion. We introduce risk-sensitivity behaviour for each agent via an exponential utility function. In the game model, each…
We present a novel framework for mean field games with finite state space and common noise, where the common noise is given through shocks that occur at random times. We first analyze the game for up to $n$ shocks, in which case we are able…
Mean field game equilibria are predicated on the assumption of immediate pairwise interactions within a population of homogeneous agents with asymptotically vanishing influence as population size increases. However, in many real-world…
Mean field games are studied in the framework of controlled martingale problems, and general existence theorems are proven in which the equilibrium control is Markovian. The framework is flexible enough to include degenerate volatility,…
We study dynamic finite-player and mean-field stochastic games within the framework of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE). Our focus is on discrete time and space structures without monotonicity. Unlike their continuous-time analogues,…
This paper studies a discrete-time major-minor mean field game of stopping where the major player can choose either an optimal control or stopping time. We look for the relaxed equilibrium as a randomized stopping policy, which is…
We consider an economy made of competing firms which are heterogeneous in their capital and use several inputs for producing goods. Their consumption policy is fixed rationally by maximizing a utility and their capital cannot fall below a…
We consider a class of $N$-player games and mean-field games of singular controls with ergodic performance criterion, providing a benchmark case for irreversible investment games featuring mean-field interaction and strategic…
This paper studies an optimal investment-consumption problem for competitive agents with exponential or power utilities and a common finite time horizon. Each agent regards the average of habit formation and wealth from all peers as…
In this paper we study a mean-field games system with Dirichlet boundary conditions in a closed domain and in a mean-field of control setting, that is in which the dynamics of each agent is affected not only by the average position of the…
We consider deterministic mean field games in which the agents control their acceleration and are constrained to remain in a domain of R n. We study relaxed equilibria in the Lagrangian setting; they are described by a probability measure…
We find closed-form solutions to the stochastic game between a broker and a mean-field of informed traders. In the finite player game, the informed traders observe a common signal and a private signal. The broker, on the other hand,…
We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game.…
We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with…