Related papers: Exponential Communication Separations between Noti…
Let $(f,P)$ be an incentive compatible mechanism where $f$ is the social choice function and $P$ is the payment function. In many important settings, $f$ uniquely determines $P$ (up to a constant) and therefore a common approach is to focus…
We study the power of randomness in the Number-on-Forehead (NOF) model in communication complexity. We construct an explicit 3-player function $f:[N]^3 \to \{0,1\}$, such that: (i) there exist a randomized NOF protocol computing it that…
We prove a general connection between the communication complexity of two-player games and the sample complexity of their multi-player locally private analogues. We use this connection to prove sample complexity lower bounds for locally…
Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…
For many tasks, the reward function is inaccessible to introspection or too complex to be specified procedurally, and must instead be learned from user data. Prior work has evaluated learned reward functions by evaluating policies optimized…
Numbers-on-Forehead (NOF) communication model is a central model in communication complexity. As a restricted variant, one-way NOF model is of particular interest. Establishing strong one-way NOF lower bounds would imply circuit lower…
We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…
We study the communication complexity of truthful combinatorial auctions, and in particular the case where valuations are either subadditive or single-minded, which we denote with $\mathsf{SubAdd}\cup\mathsf{SingleM}$. We show that for…
We study notions of fairness in decision-making systems when individuals have diverse preferences over the possible outcomes of the decisions. Our starting point is the seminal work of Dwork et al. which introduced a notion of individual…
We give an exponential separation between one-way quantum and classical communication protocols for a partial Boolean function (a variant of the Boolean Hidden Matching Problem of Bar-Yossef et al.) Earlier such an exponential separation…
We characterize epistemic consequences of truthful communication among rational agents in a game-theoretic setting. To this end we introduce normal-form games equipped with an interaction structure, which specifies which groups of players…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal distributions. As in the standard…
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with $m$ items and two subadditive bidders. A $\frac{1}{2}$-approximation can be guaranteed by a trivial randomized protocol with zero communication, or…
In this work we revisit the Boolean Hidden Matching communication problem, which was the first communication problem in the one-way model to demonstrate an exponential classical-quantum communication separation. In this problem, Alice's…
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…
This paper introduces a bilateral matching mechanism to explain why different populations have different levels of cooperation. The traditional game theory assumes that individuals can acquire their neighbor's information without cost after…