Related papers: Controlling conditional expectations by zero-deter…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…

A decision maker repeatedly chooses one of a finite set of actions. In each period, the decision maker's payoff depends on fixed basic payoff of the chosen action and the frequency with which the action has been chosen in the past. We…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement against an adversary in uncertain networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious…

In timeline-based planning, domains are described as sets of independent, but interacting, components, whose behaviour over time (the set of timelines) is governed by a set of temporal constraints. A distinguishing feature of timeline-based…

We consider the computational complexity of the question whether a certain strategy can be removed from a game by means of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. In particular, we study the influence of different definitions of…

For the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, there exist Markov strategies which solve the problem when we restrict attention to the long term average payoff. When used by both players these assure the cooperative payoff for each of them. Neither…

Priced timed games are optimal-cost reachability games played between two players---the controller and the environment---by moving a token along the edges of infinite graphs of configurations of priced timed automata. The goal of the…

Nearly all simulation-based games have environment parameters that affect incentives in the interaction but are not explicitly incorporated into the game model. To understand the impact of these parameters on strategic incentives, typical…

We study zero-sum stochastic games for controlled discrete time Markov chains with risk-sensitive average cost criterion with countable state space and Borel action spaces. The payoff function is nonnegative and possibly unbounded. Under a…

Replicator dynamics have been widely used in evolutionary game theory to model how strategy frequencies evolve over time in large populations. The so-called payoff matrix encodes the pairwise fitness that each strategy obtains when…

Motivated by a number of real-world applications from domains like healthcare and sustainable transportation, in this paper we study a scenario of repeated principal-agent games within a multi-armed bandit (MAB) framework, where: the…

In the present work, we consider 2-person zero-sum stochastic differential games with a nonlinear pay-off functional which is defined through a backward stochastic differential equation. Our main objective is to study for such a game the…

Optimal behavior in (competitive) situation is traditionally determined with the help of utility functions that measure the payoff of different actions. Given an ordering on the space of revenues (payoffs), the classical axiomatic approach…

Game semantics describe the interactive behavior of proofs by interpreting formulas as games on which proofs induce strategies. Such a semantics is introduced here for capturing dependencies induced by quantifications in first-order…

Strategies for sustaining cooperation and preventing exploitation by selfish agents in repeated games have mostly been restricted to Markovian strategies where the response of an agent depends on the actions in the previous round. Such…

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update…

A new solution concept for two-player zero-sum matrix games with multi-dimensional payoff is introduced. It is based on extensions of vector orders in K-dimensional spaces to order relations in their power sets, so-called set relations, and…

Game semantics describe the interactive behavior of proofs by interpreting formulas as games on which proofs induce strategies. Such a semantics is introduced here for capturing dependencies induced by quantifications in first-order…

This paper studies a dynamic discrete-time queuing model where at every period players get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players have an incentive to send their jobs as late as possible;…