Related papers: Evolutionary Game Theory Squared: Evolving Agents …
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an important solution concept in game theory which has been applied frequently to biological models. Informally an ESS is a strategy that if followed by the population cannot be taken over by a…
In this work we have used computer models of social-like networks to show by extensive numerical simulations that cooperation in evolutionary games can emerge and be stable on this class of networks. The amounts of cooperation reached are…
Evolutionary game dynamics are often studied in the context of different population structures. Here we propose a new population structure that is inspired by simple multicellular life forms. In our model, cells reproduce but can stay…
The recently developed mean-field game models of corruption and bot-net defence in cyber-security, the evolutionary game approach to inspection and corruption, and the pressure-resistance game element, can be combined under an extended…
When group members claim a portion of limited resources, it is tempting to invest more effort to get a larger share. However, if everyone acts similarly, they all get the same piece they would obtain without extra effort. This is the…
By specifying behaviour across multiple agents, social norms are a coordination approach to resolving social dilemmas. Decentralized and wide adoption can be achieved by norms whose prescription involves interpreting stochastic signals in…
The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies remains a challenging issue across disciplines. It is an important subject also in the evolutionary game theory to research how cooperation arises. The…
A central challenge in building continually improving agents is that training environments are typically static or manually constructed. This restricts continual learning and generalization beyond the training distribution. We address this…
We consider evolutionary games in which the agent selected for update compares their payoff to q neighbours, rather than a single neighbour as in standard evolutionary game theory. Through studying fixed point stability and fixation times…
Collective intelligence emerges across biological, physical, and artificial systems without central coordination, yet a unifying principle governing such behaviour remains elusive. The Free Energy Principle explains how individual agents…
We present a general framework for evolutionary learning to emergent unbiased state representation without any supervision. Evolutionary frameworks such as self-play converge to bad local optima in case of multi-agent reinforcement learning…
We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the…
The emergence and promotion of cooperation are two of the main issues in evolutionary game theory, as cooperation is amenable to exploitation by defectors, which take advantage of cooperative individuals at no cost, dooming them to…
Replicator dynamics have been widely used in evolutionary game theory to model how strategy frequencies evolve over time in large populations. The so-called payoff matrix encodes the pairwise fitness that each strategy obtains when…
Competition for available resources is natural amongst coexisting species, and the fittest contenders dominate over the rest in evolution. The dynamics of this selection is studied using a simple linear model. It has similarities to…
We study the behavior of a stochastic variant of replicator dynamics in two-agent zero-sum games. We characterize the statistics of such systems by their invariant measures which can be shown to be entirely supported on the boundary of the…
We study a wide class of non-convex non-concave min-max games that generalizes over standard bilinear zero-sum games. In this class, players control the inputs of a smooth function whose output is being applied to a bilinear zero-sum game.…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
Recent advances in quantum computing and in particular, the introduction of quantum GANs, have led to increased interest in quantum zero-sum game theory, extending the scope of learning algorithms for classical games into the quantum realm.…
Heterogeneity has been studied as one of the most common explanations of the puzzle of cooperation in social dilemmas. A large number of papers have been published discussing the effects of increasing heterogeneity in structured populations…