Related papers: Tit-for-Tat Strategy as a Deformed Zero-Determinan…

For the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, there exist Markov strategies which solve the problem when we restrict attention to the long term average payoff. When used by both players these assure the cooperative payoff for each of them. Neither…

When people play a repeated game they usually try to anticipate their opponents' moves based on past observations, and then decide what action to take next. Behavioural economics studies the mechanisms by which strategic decisions are taken…

We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…

Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…

We investigate the quantization of non-zero sum games. For the particular case of the Prisoners' Dilemma we show that this game ceases to pose a dilemma if quantum strategies are allowed for. We also construct a particular quantum strategy…

In this paper we study two-player bilinear zero-sum games with constrained strategy spaces. An instance of natural occurrences of such constraints is when mixed strategies are used, which correspond to a probability simplex constraint. We…

We introduce a nonlinear degenerate parabolic equation containing a nonlocal term. The equation serves as a replicator dynamics model where the set of strategies is a continuum. In our model the payoff operator (which is the continuous…

Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…

We develop an option pricing model based on a tug-of-war game. This two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game is formulated in the context of a multi-dimensional financial market. The issuer and the holder try to manipulate asset…

A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…

Evolutionary game theory provides a mathematical foundation for cross-disciplinary fertilization, especially for integrating ideas from artificial intelligence and game theory. Such integration offers a transparent and rigorous approach to…

Human social life is shaped by repeated interactions, where past experiences guide future behavior. In evolutionary game theory, a key challenge is to identify strategies that harness such memory to succeed in repeated encounters. Decades…

In this paper, we present a novel, game-theoretic model of deception in two-player, zero-sum games. Our framework leverages an information asymmetry: one player (the deceiver) has access to accurate payoff information, while the other (the…

In society, mutual cooperation, defection, and asymmetric exploitative relationships are common. Whereas cooperation and defection are studied extensively in the literature on game theory, asymmetric exploitative relationships between…

We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…

We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the…

Strategic decision-making in uncertain and adversarial environments is crucial for the security of modern systems and infrastructures. A salient feature of many optimal decision-making policies is a level of unpredictability, or randomness,…

Replicator dynamics have been widely used in evolutionary game theory to model how strategy frequencies evolve over time in large populations. The so-called payoff matrix encodes the pairwise fitness that each strategy obtains when…

Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…

Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…