Related papers: Tit-for-Tat Strategy as a Deformed Zero-Determinan…

Repeated games are useful models to analyze long term interactions of living species and complex social phenomena. Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in repeated games discovered by Press and Dyson in 2012 enforce a linear payoff relationship…

We use replicator dynamics to study an iterated prisoners' dilemma game with memory. In this study, we investigate the characteristics of all 32 possible strategies with a single-step memory by observing the results when each strategy…

Since the introduction of zero-determinant strategies, extortionate strategies have received considerable interest. While an interesting class of strategies, the definitions of extortionate strategies are algebraically rigid, apply only to…

We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…

This work lies in the fusion of experimental economics and data mining. It continues author's previous work on mining behaviour rules of human subjects from experimental data, where game-theoretic predictions partially fail to work.…

We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class…

We investigate the repeated prisoner's dilemma game where both players alternately use reinforcement learning to obtain their optimal memory-one strategies. We theoretically solve the simultaneous Bellman optimality equations of…

Evolutionary game theory has been an important tool for describing economic and social behaviour for decades. Approximate mean value equations describing the time evolution of strategy concentrations can be derived from the players'…

Indifference of a player with respect to two distinct outcomes of a game cannot be handled by small perturbations, because the actual choice may have significant impact on other players, and cause them to act in a way that has significant…

We investigate symmetric equilibria of mutual reinforcement learning when both players alternately learn the optimal memory-two strategies against the opponent in the repeated prisoners' dilemma game. We provide a necessary condition for…

Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…

We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform…

We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing…

In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…

One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma, namely the Prisoner's Dilemma. Specifically, for a…

The prisoner's dilemma (PD) is a game-theoretic model studied in a wide array of fields to understand the emergence of cooperation between rational self-interested agents. In this work, we formulate a spatial iterated PD as a discrete-event…

Deception is a crucial tool in the cyberdefence repertoire, enabling defenders to leverage their informational advantage to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks. One way deception can be employed is through obscuring, or masking,…

So far, the theory of equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is insensitive to communication possibilities. To address this issue, we incorporate the assumption that communication reduces -- but does not…

We consider tit-for-tat dynamics in production markets, where there is a set of $n$ players connected via a weighted graph. Each player $i$ can produce an eponymous good using its linear production function, given as input various amounts…

Feint actions refer to a set of deceptive actions, which enable players to obtain temporal advantages from their opponents. Such actions are regarded as widely-used tactic in most non-deterministic Two-player Games (e.g. boxing and…