Related papers: AIR-FI: Generating Covert Wi-Fi Signals from Air-G…

Wireless covert channels promise to exfiltrate information with high bandwidth by circumventing traditional access control mechanisms. Ideally, they are only accessible by the intended recipient and---for regular system…

Infrared (IR) light is invisible to humans, but cameras are optically sensitive to this type of light. In this paper, we show how attackers can use surveillance cameras and infrared light to establish bi-directional covert communication…

In this paper we show how two (or more) airgapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data via ultrasonic waves. Microphones are not required. Our method is based on the…

Air-gapped computers are computers which are kept isolated from the Internet, because they store and process sensitive information. When highly sensitive data is involved, an air-gapped computer might also be kept secluded in a Faraday…

In recent years researchers have demonstrated how attackers could use USB connectors implanted with RF transmitters to exfiltrate data from secure, and even air-gapped, computers (e.g., COTTONMOUTH in the leaked NSA ANT catalog). Such…

This paper introduces a new type of attack on isolated, air-gapped workstations. Although air-gap computers have no wireless connectivity, we show that attackers can use the SATA cable as a wireless antenna to transfer radio signals at the…

In this paper we present a method which allows attackers to covertly leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers. Our method utilizes the hard disk drive (HDD) activity LED which exists in most of today's desktop PCs, laptops and servers.…

Personal data has become one of the most valuable assets and lucrative targets for attackers in the modern digital world. This includes personal identification information (PII), medical records, legal information, biometric data, and…

Physical isolation, so called air-gapping, is an effective method for protecting security-critical computers and networks. While it might be possible to introduce malicious code through the supply chain, insider attacks, or social…

The spoofing attack is critical to bypass physical-layer signal authentication. This paper presents a deep learning-based spoofing attack to generate synthetic wireless signals that cannot be statistically distinguished from intended…

Using the keyboard LEDs to send data optically was proposed in 2002 by Loughry and Umphress [1] (Appendix A). In this paper we extensively explore this threat in the context of a modern cyber-attack with current hardware and optical…

We show that as a side effect of building code requirements, almost all commercial buildings today are vulnerable to a novel data exfiltration attack, even if they are air-gapped and secured against traditional attacks. The new attack uses…

Wireless communication is susceptible to adversarial eavesdropping due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. In this paper it is shown how eavesdropping can be alleviated by exploiting the superposition property of the wireless…

Wi-Fi sensing has become an attractive option for non-invasive monitoring of human activities and vital signs. This paper explores the feasibility of using state-of-the-art commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) devices for Wi-Fi sensing…

The paper presents a novel approach of spoofing wireless signals by using a general adversarial network (GAN) to generate and transmit synthetic signals that cannot be reliably distinguished from intended signals. It is of paramount…

Air-gapped systems are considered highly secure against data leaks due to their physical isolation from external networks. Despite this protection, ultrasonic communication has been demonstrated as an effective method for exfiltrating data…

We unveil the existence of a vulnerability in Wi-Fi, which allows an adversary to remotely launch a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack that propagates both in time and space. This vulnerability stems from a coupling effect induced by hidden…

Attacks based on power analysis have been long existing and studied, with some recent works focused on data exfiltration from victim systems without using conventional communications (e.g., WiFi). Nonetheless, prior works typically rely on…

The light-emitting diode(LED) is widely used as an indicator on the information device. Early in 2002, Loughry et al studied the exfiltration of LED indicators and found the kind of LEDs unmodulated to indicate some state of the device can…

In recent years, various out-of-band covert channels have been proposed that demonstrate the feasibility of leaking data out of computers without the need for network connectivity. The methods proposed have been based on different type of…