English

USBee: Air-Gap Covert-Channel via Electromagnetic Emission from USB

Cryptography and Security 2016-08-31 v1

Abstract

In recent years researchers have demonstrated how attackers could use USB connectors implanted with RF transmitters to exfiltrate data from secure, and even air-gapped, computers (e.g., COTTONMOUTH in the leaked NSA ANT catalog). Such methods require a hardware modification of the USB plug or device, in which a dedicated RF transmitter is embedded. In this paper we present USBee, a software that can utilize an unmodified USB device connected to a computer as a RF transmitter. We demonstrate how a software can intentionally generate controlled electromagnetic emissions from the data bus of a USB connector. We also show that the emitted RF signals can be controlled and modulated with arbitrary binary data. We implement a prototype of USBee, and discuss its design and implementation details including signal generation and modulation. We evaluate the transmitter by building a receiver and demodulator using GNU Radio. Our evaluation shows that USBee can be used for transmitting binary data to a nearby receiver at a bandwidth of 20 to 80 BPS (bytes per second).

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1608.08397,
  title  = {USBee: Air-Gap Covert-Channel via Electromagnetic Emission from USB},
  author = {Mordechai Guri and Matan Monitz and Yuval Elovici},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.08397},
  year   = {2016}
}