Related papers: Trembling-Hand Perfection and Correlation in Seque…

It is a well-known fact that correlated equilibria can be computed in polynomial time in a large class of concisely represented games using the celebrated Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm (Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008; Jiang and…

While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…

We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on mediator errors, called correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPE is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex sets. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE…

It is NP-hard to decide if a given pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a given three-player game in strategic form with integer payoffs is trembling hand perfect.

We analyse Selten's concept of trembling hand perfect equilibria in the context of quantum game theory. We define trembles as mixed quantum strategies by replacing discrete probabilities with probability distribution functions. Explicit…

The Nash Equilibrium (NE) assumes rational play in imperfect-information Extensive-Form Games (EFGs) but fails to ensure optimal strategies for off-equilibrium branches of the game tree, potentially leading to suboptimal outcomes in…

Motivated by applications to data networks where fast convergence is essential, we analyze the problem of learning in generic N-person games that admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Specifically, we consider a scenario where…

Normal-form proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson as a refinement of normal-form perfect equilibrium, occupies a distinctive position in the equilibrium analysis of extensive-form games because its more stringent perturbation structure…

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…

We study the complexity of computing or approximating refinements of Nash equilibrium for a given finite n-player extensive form game of perfect recall (EFGPR), where n >= 3. Our results apply to a number of well-studied refinements,…

The proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson (1978), is a classic refinement of the Nash equilibrium that has been referred to as the "mother of all refinements." For normal-form games, computing a proper equilibrium is known to be…

Sequential equilibrium is one of the most fundamental refinements of Nash equilibrium for games in extensive form. However, it is not defined for extensive-form games in which a player can choose among a continuum of actions. We define a…

We study the problem of computing optimal correlated equilibria (CEs) in infinite-horizon multi-player stochastic games, where correlation signals are provided over time. In this setting, optimal CEs require history-dependent policies; this…

The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games; we close this fundamental gap in this paper. We first show…

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium for imperfect-information extensive-form games (EFGs) that enforces consistency between the two components of a solution: agents' strategy profile describing their…

We consider a finite horizon repeated game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Their actions and types jointly determine their instantaneous rewards. In each period,…

The paper studies fictitious play (FP) learning dynamics in continuous time. It is shown that in almost every potential game, and for almost every initial condition, the rate of convergence of FP is exponential. In particular, the paper…

The extensive-form game has been studied considerably in recent years. It can represent games with multiple decision points and incomplete information, and hence it is helpful in formulating games with uncertain inputs, such as poker. We…

This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in discounted repeated games. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE. Then the initial…

For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…