Related papers: Equitable preference relations on infinite utility…
This paper presents findings from a web-experiment on a representative sample of the French population. It examines the acceptability of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, which posits that transferring income from an individual to a…
When evaluating policies that affect future generations, the most commonly used criterion is the discounted utilitarian rule. However, in terms of intergenerational fairness, it is difficult to justify prioritizing the current generation…
There exists a preference relation on infinite utility streams that does not discriminate between different periods, satisfies the Pareto criterion, and so that almost all pairs of utility streams are strictly comparable. Such a preference…
We study social welfare relations (SWRs) on an infinite population. Our main result is a new characterization of a utilitarian SWR as the \emph{largest} SWR (in terms of subset when the weak relation is viewed as a set of pairs) which…
We consider the egalitarian welfare aspects of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal…
We propose a new model for aggregating preferences over a set of indivisible items based on a quantile value. In this model, each agent is endowed with a specific quantile, and the value of a given bundle is defined by the corresponding…
Recent literature in the last Maximum Entropy workshop introduced an analogy between cumulative probability distributions and normalized utility functions. Based on this analogy, a utility density function can de defined as the derivative…
Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of…
We study the nature (i.e., constructive as opposed to non-constructive) of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams, and their representability by means of real-valued functions. We assume finite anonymity and introduce a new…
This work deals with the implementation of social choice rules using dominant strategies for unrestricted preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that only few unappealing social choice rules can be implemented unless…
We advance a general theory of coherent preference that surrenders restrictions embodied in orthodox doctrine. This theory enjoys the property that any preference system admits extension to a complete system of preferences, provided it…
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a voting paradigm for distributing a divisible resource, usually called a budget, among a set of projects by aggregating the preferences of individuals over these projects. It is implemented quite extensively…
When allocating indivisible resources or tasks, an envy-free allocation or equitable allocation may not exist. We present a sufficient condition and an algorithm to achieve envy-freeness and equitability when monetary transfers are allowed.…
Standard decision theory seeks conditions under which a preference relation can be compressed into a single real-valued function. However, when preferences are incomplete or intransitive, a single function fails to capture the agent's…
In this paper we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility cooperative games with a priori unions. In the case of the equal…
We characterize Pareto optimality via "near" weighted utilitarian welfare maximization. One characterization sequentially maximizes utilitarian welfare functions using a finite sequence of nonnegative and eventually positive welfare…
Total social welfare relations satisfying Pareto and equity principles on infinite utility streams has revealed a non-constructive nature. In this paper we study more deeply the needed fragment of AC. In particular, we show that such…
This paper examines optimal risk sharing for empirically realistic risk attitudes, providing results on Pareto optimality, competitive equilibria, utility frontiers, and the first and second theorems of welfare. Contrary to common…
We analyze the run-time complexity of computing allocations that are both fair and maximize the utilitarian social welfare, defined as the sum of agents' utilities. We focus on two tractable fairness concepts: envy-freeness up to one item…
In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive…