Related papers: Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Cons…

The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an interaction between two agents: sender and receiver. The…

In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…

Prior information often takes the form of parameter constraints. Bayesian methods include such information through prior distributions having constrained support. By using posterior sampling algorithms, one can quantify uncertainty without…

Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study…

We study the bounds of mediated communication in sender-receiver games in which the sender's payoff is state-independent. We show that the feasible distributions over the receiver's beliefs under mediation are those that induce zero…

We study how to communicate findings of Bayesian inference to third parties, while preserving the strong guarantee of differential privacy. Our main contributions are four different algorithms for private Bayesian inference on…

It is shown that a consistent application of Bayesian updating from a prior probability density to a posterior using evidence in the form of expectation constraints leads to exactly the same results as the application of the maximum entropy…

Prominent opinion formation models such as the one by Friedkin and Johnsen (FJ) concentrate on the effects of peer pressure on public opinions. In practice, opinion formation is also based on information about the state of the world and…

We study a Bayesian persuasion game where a sender wants to persuade a receiver to take a binary action, such as purchasing a product. The sender is informed about the (real-valued) state of the world, such as the quality of the product,…

We study a model of persuasion in which the receiver is a `conservative Bayesian' whose updated belief is a convex combination of the prior and the correct Bayesian posterior. While in the classic Bayesian case providing information…

Achieving the Bayes optimal binary classification rule subject to group fairness constraints is known to be reducible, in some cases, to learning a group-wise thresholding rule over the Bayes regressor. In this paper, we extend this result…

This paper considers Bayesian persuasion for routing games where information about the uncertain state of the network is provided by a traffic information system (TIS) using public signals. In this setup, the TIS commits to a signalling…

We develop an algorithmic framework to incorporate "ex-ante" constraints on outcomes (that hold only on average) into stateful sequential search with costly inspection. Our framework encompasses the classical Weitzman's Pandora's box…

Modeling what makes an advertisement persuasive, i.e., eliciting the desired response from consumer, is critical to the study of propaganda, social psychology, and marketing. Despite its importance, computational modeling of persuasion in…

This paper considers data-driven chance-constrained stochastic optimization problems in a Bayesian framework. Bayesian posteriors afford a principled mechanism to incorporate data and prior knowledge into stochastic optimization problems.…

Bayesian models of group learning are studied in Economics since the 1970s. and more recently in computational linguistics. The models from Economics postulate that agents maximize utility in their communication and actions. The Economics…

Bayesian inference has theoretical attractions as a principled framework for reasoning about beliefs. However, the motivations of Bayesian inference which claim it to be the only 'rational' kind of reasoning do not apply in practice. They…

Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents' decisions via strategic information revelation --- often described as a signaling scheme --- in order to yield the most desirable equilibrium outcome. Recently, there has been a large…

Political and advertising campaigns increasingly exploit social networks to spread information and persuade people. This paper studies a persuasion model to examine whether such a strategy is better than simply sending public signals.…

To make decisions we are guided by the evidence we collect, as well as the opinions of friends and neighbors. How do we integrate our private beliefs with information we obtain from our social network? To understand the strategies humans…