Related papers: Strategy-proof Popular Mechanisms
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the voters' preferences over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. In a seminal result, Gibbard (1977) has characterized the set of SDSs that are strategyproof with…
The theory of algorithmic fair allocation is within the center of multi-agent systems and economics in the last decade due to its industrial and social importance. At a high level, the problem is to assign a set of items that are either…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to multiple agents. Recent work [Bouveret and Lang, 2011] focused on allocating goods in a sequential way, and studied what is the "best" sequence of agents to pick objects based…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
We study the truthful facility assignment problem, where a set of agents with private most-preferred points on a metric space are assigned to facilities that lie on the metric space, under capacity constraints on the facilities. The goal is…
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of this setting, in which voters can support multiple parties by…
I develop a revealed preference framework to test whether an aggregate allocation of indivisible objects satisfies Pareto efficiency and individual rationality (PI) without observing individual preferences. Exploiting the type-based…
The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider the problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with…
We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional…
In many prediction problems, the predictive model affects the distribution of the prediction target. This phenomenon is known as performativity and is often caused by the behavior of individuals with vested interests in the outcome of the…
Social media platforms systematically reward popularity over authenticity, incentivizing users to strategically tailor their expression for attention. In this paper, we introduce (i) popularity as a strategic expression mechanism, distinct…
The definition of preferences assigned to individuals is a concept that concerns many disciplines, from economics, with the search of an acceptable outcome for an ensemble of individuals, to decision making an analysis of vote systems. We…
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible public goods. We model the public goods as elements with feasibility constraints on what subsets of elements can be chosen, and assume that agents have additive utilities across…
Finding an envy-free allocation of indivisible resources to agents is a central task in many multiagent systems. Often, non-trivial envy-free allocations do not exist, and, when they do, finding them can be computationally hard. Classical…
We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…
The purpose of this note is to prove the existence of a randomized mechanism, a social decision scheme (SDS), with desirable fairness, efficiency, and strategyproofness properties unmatched by all known SDSs. In particular, we disprove a…
This paper considers the problem of offering a scarce object with a common unobserved quality to strategic agents in a priority queue. Each agent has a private signal over the quality of the object and observes the decisions made by other…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…