Related papers: Some game theoretic marketing attribution models

Inspired by applications such as supply chain management, epidemics, and social networks, we formulate a stochastic game model that addresses three key features common across these domains: 1) network-structured player interactions, 2)…

User interactions in online recommendation platforms create interdependencies among content creators: feedback on one creator's content influences the system's learning and, in turn, the exposure of other creators' contents. To analyze…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

We study the cost sharing problem for cooperative games in situations where the cost function $C$ is not available via oracle queries, but must instead be derived from data, represented as tuples $(S, C(S))$, for different subsets $S$ of…

We extend the coopetition index introduced by Aleandri and Dall'Aglio (2025) for simple games to the broader class of monotone transferable utility (TU) games and to all non-empty coalitions, including singletons. The new formulation allows…

We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…

A recurring theme in recent computer science literature is that proper design of signaling schemes is a crucial aspect of effective mechanisms aiming to optimize social welfare or revenue. One of the research endeavors of this line of work…

We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to…

Coalitional games serve the purpose of modeling payoff distribution problems in scenarios where agents can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. In the classical Transferable Utility…

Coalition formation is often modeled as a static equilibrium problem, neglecting the dynamic processes governing how agents self-organize. This paper proposes a dynamic split-and-merge framework that balances two conflicting economic…

In this paper, we study the total displacement statistic of parking functions from the perspective of cooperative game theory. We introduce parking games, which are coalitional cost-sharing games in characteristic function form derived from…

A number of techniques have been proposed to explain a machine learning model's prediction by attributing it to the corresponding input features. Popular among these are techniques that apply the Shapley value method from cooperative game…

This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems with unit execution times to minimize the sum of completion times. By supposing an initial schedule and associating each job (consisting in a number of…

Designing fair compensation mechanisms for demand response (DR) is challenging. This paper models the problem in a game theoretic setting and designs a payment distribution mechanism based on the Shapley Value. As exact computation of the…

In this paper, we address the problem of fair sharing of the total value of a crowd-sourced network system between major participants (founders) and minor participants (crowd) using cooperative game theory. Shapley allocation is regarded as…

The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…

A new solution concept for two-player zero-sum matrix games with multi-dimensional payoff is introduced. It is based on extensions of vector orders in K-dimensional spaces to order relations in their power sets, so-called set relations, and…

In this work we consider an agent based model in order to study the wealth distribution problem where the interchange is determined with a symmetric zero sum game. Simultaneously, the agents update their way of play trying to learn the…

Cooperative game theory methods, notably Shapley values, have significantly enhanced machine learning (ML) interpretability. However, existing explainable AI (XAI) frameworks mainly attribute average model predictions, overlooking…

In this paper, a novel framework for normative modeling of the spectrum sensing and sharing problem in cognitive radios (CRs) as a transferable utility (TU) cooperative game is proposed. Secondary users (SUs) jointly sense the spectrum and…