Related papers: Best response dynamics on random graphs

Cooperation plays a fundamental role in societal and biological domains, and the population structure profoundly shapes the dynamics of evolution. Practically, individuals behave either altruistically or egoistically in multiple groups,…

A binary game is introduced and analysed. N players have to choose one of the two sides independently and those on the minority side win. Players uses a finite set of ad hoc strategies to make their decision, based on the past record. The…

In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric $N$-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other…

We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different…

We propose and analyze a broad family of games played by resource-constrained players, which are characterized by the following central features: 1) each user has a multi-dimensional action space, subject to a single sum resource…

We introduce and analyze a purely competitive dynamics for the evolution of an infinite population subject to a 3-strategy game. We argue that this dynamics represents a characterization of how certain systems, both natural and artificial,…

Evolutionary game theory is an abstract and simple, but very powerful way to model evolutionary dynamics. Even complex biological phenomena can sometimes be abstracted to simple two-player games. But often, the interaction between several…

We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple…

This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…

Evolutionary spatial 2 x 2 games between heterogeneous agents are analyzed using different variants of cellular automata (CA). Agents play repeatedly against their nearest neighbors 2 x 2 games specified by a rescaled payoff matrix with two…

How coperation between self-interested individuals evolve is a crucial problem, both in biology and in social sciences, that is far from being well understood. Evolutionary game theory is a useful approach to this issue. The simplest model…

In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…

Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are defined to predict the outcome of such situations.…

This paper studies the optimization of strategies in the context of possibly randomized two players zero-sum games with incomplete information. We compare 5 algorithms for tuning the parameters of strategies over a benchmark of 12 games. A…

We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…

We prove that in a normal form n-player game with m actions for each player, there exists an approximate Nash equilibrium where each player randomizes uniformly among a set of O(log(m) + log(n)) pure strategies. This result induces an…

Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…

People choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. The process can be modelled as an evolutionary game dynamics system, which may be…

We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…

Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…