Related papers: Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Ac…
While the stable marriage problem and its variants model a vast range of matching markets, they fail to capture complex agent relationships, such as the affiliation of applicants and employers in an interview marketplace. To model this…
In this paper, we investigate the probabilistic variants of the strategy logics ATL and ATL* under imperfect information. Specifically, we present novel decidability and complexity results when the model transitions are stochastic and…
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result…
We formalize trust calibration for agentic tool use (deciding when an automated agent's proposed action may execute autonomously versus require human approval) as a preference-learning problem. A policy gateway maintains a Gaussian-process…
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…
This paper maps out the relation between different approaches for handling preferences in argumentation with strict rules and defeasible assumptions by offering translations between them. The systems we compare are: non-prioritized defeats…
Priority-based allocation of individuals to positions are pervasive, and elimination of justified envy is often, an absolute requirement. This leaves serial dictatorship (SD) as the only rule that avoids justified envy under standard direct…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
In real-world settings of the Deferred Acceptance stable matching algorithm, such as the American medical residency match (NRMP), school choice programs, and various national university entrance systems, candidates need to decide which…
In this work, we analyze the influence of a single strategic agent on the quality of the other agents' matchings in a matching market. We consider a stable matching problem with $n$ men and $n$ women when preferences are drawn uniformly…
One of the basic properties of a queueing network is stability. Roughly speaking, it is the property that the total number of jobs in the network remains bounded as a function of time. One of the key questions related to the stability issue…
In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a…
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test…
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict…
The CSP of a first-order theory $T$ is the problem of deciding for a given finite set $S$ of atomic formulas whether $T \cup S$ is satisfiable. Let $T_1$ and $T_2$ be two theories with countably infinite models and disjoint signatures.…
Preferences play a key role in determining what goals/constraints to satisfy when not all constraints can be satisfied simultaneously. In this work, we study preference-based planning in a stochastic system modeled as a Markov decision…
In this work, we are interested in studying multi-agent routing settings, where adversarial agents are part of the assignment and decision loop, degrading the performance of the fleet by incurring bounded delays while servicing…