Related papers: A Reputation for Honesty
We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence.…
Consider an application sold on an on-line platform, with the app paying a commission fee and, henceforth, offered for sale on the platform. The ability to sell the application depends on its customer ranking. Therefore, developers may have…
Effectively mitigating online misinformation requires understanding of their mechanisms and learning of practical skills for identification and counteraction. Serious games may serve as tools for combating misinformation, teaching players…
Motivated by kidney exchange, we study the following mechanism-design problem: On a directed graph (of transplant compatibilities among patient-donor pairs), the mechanism must select a simple path (a chain of transplantations) starting at…
Transparency is a fundamental requirement for decision making systems when these should be deployed in the real world. It is usually achieved by providing explanations of the system's behavior. A prominent and intuitive type of explanations…
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…
We consider the problem of predicting human players' actions in repeated strategic interactions. Our goal is to predict the dynamic step-by-step behavior of individual players in previously unseen games. We study the ability of neural…
While existing evaluations of large language models (LLMs) measure deception rates, the underlying conditions that give rise to deceptive behavior are poorly understood. We investigate this question using a novel dataset of realistic moral…
Spatial structure has a profound effect on the outcome of evolutionary games. In the ultimatum game, it leads to the dominance of much fairer players than those predicted to evolve in well-mixed settings. Here we show that spatiality leads…
There are $n$ players who compete by timing their actions. An opportunity appears randomly on a time interval. Whoever takes an action the fastest after the opportunity has arisen wins. The occurrence of the opportunity is observed only…
An individual can only experience regret if she learns about an unchosen alternative. In many situations, learning about an unchosen alternative is possible only if someone else chose it. We develop a model where the ex-post information…
We study the interpersonal trust of a population of agents, asking whether chance may decide if a population ends up in a high trust or low trust state. We model this by a discrete time, random matching stochastic coordination game. Agents…
In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…
An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame-perfect…
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…
We study a rating system in which a set of individuals (e.g., the customers of a restaurant) evaluate a given service (e.g, the restaurant), with their aggregated opinion determining the probability of all individuals to use the service and…
Player ranking can be used to determine the quality of the contributions of a player to a collaborative community. However, collaborative games with no explicit objectives do not support player ranking, as there is no metric to measure the…
I consider decision-making constrained by considerations of morality, rationality, or other virtues. The decision maker (DM) has a true preference over outcomes, but feels compelled to choose among outcomes that are top-ranked by some…
We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. By adopting a rather strict definition of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes only - we can show that every strictly correct quantum protocol…
In learning problems, the noise inherent to the task at hand hinders the possibility to infer without a certain degree of uncertainty. Quantifying this uncertainty, regardless of its wide use, assumes high relevance for security-sensitive…