Related papers: A Reputation for Honesty
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…
This paper presents the first systematic investigation of the potential performance gains for crowdsourcing systems, deriving from available information at the requester about individual worker earnestness (reputation). In particular, we…
We study games in which every action requires planning and preparation. Moreover, before players act, they can revise their plans based on partially revealing information that they receive on their adversary's preparations. In turn, we…
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and…
What would you do if you were invited to play a game where you were given \$25 and allowed to place bets for 30 minutes on a coin that you were told was biased to come up heads 60% of the time? This is exactly what we did, gathering 61…
From marketing to politics, exploitation of incomplete information through selective communication of arguments is ubiquitous. In this work, we focus on development of an argumentation-theoretic model for manipulable multi-agent…
Nowadays, most business and social interactions have moved to the internet, highlighting the relevance of creating online trust. One way to obtain a measure of trust is through reputation mechanisms, which record one's past performance and…
How do incentive levels affect strategic behaviour? We address this with an experiment that separately identifies own- and opponent-incentive effects in two dominance-solvable games that differ in strategic complexity. Higher own incentives…
We consider decision problems under uncertainty where the options available to a decision maker and the resulting outcome are related through a causal mechanism which is unknown to the decision maker. We ask how a decision maker can learn…
A fundamental decision faced by a firm hiring employees - and a familiar one to anyone who has dealt with the academic job market, for example - is deciding what caliber of candidates to pursue. Should the firm try to increase its…
Creating incentives for cooperation is a challenge in natural and artificial systems. One potential answer is reputation, whereby agents trade the immediate cost of cooperation for the future benefits of having a good reputation. Game…
We study a modified version of the Naming Game, a recently introduced model which describes how shared vocabulary can emerge spontaneously in a population without any central control. In particular, we introduce a new mechanism that allows…
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition…
We study a repeated sender-receiver game where inspections are public but the sender's action is hidden unless inspected. A detected deception ends the relationship or triggers a finite punishment. We show the public state is one…
Bitcoin-otc is a peer to peer (over-the-counter) marketplace for trading with bit- coin crypto-currency. To mitigate the risks of the p2p unsupervised exchanges, the establishment of a reliable reputation systems is needed: for this reason,…
Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…
Large language models are known to produce outputs that are plausible but factually incorrect. To prevent people from making erroneous decisions by blindly trusting AI, researchers have explored various ways of communicating factuality…
Reputation systems aim to reduce the risk of loss due to untrustworthy participants. This loss is aggravated by dishonest advisors trying to pollute the e-market environment for their self-interest. A major task of a reputation system is to…
We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…