Related papers: A Reputation for Honesty
We elicit incomplete preferences over monetary gambles with subjective uncertainty. Subjects rank gambles, and these rankings are used to estimate preferences; payments are based on estimated preferences. About 40\% of subjects express…
To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the follower a chance to provide fake information and influence…
Indirect reciprocity is a reputation-based mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly meet. The conditions under which cooperation based on indirect reciprocity occurs have been examined in…
Reputation is not just a simple opinion that an individual has about another but a social construct that emerges through communication. Despite the huge importance in coordinating human behavior, such a communicative aspect has remained…
There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest…
When does reputation make experts play it safe, and what policy reverses that? I isolate a single lever - visibility of outcomes. In a two-page model with binary signals and outcomes, I show: (i) with an uninformative safe option and…
Previous research has shown how indirect reciprocity can promote cooperation through evolutionary game theoretic models. Most work in this field assumes a separation of time-scales: individuals' reputations equilibrate at a fast time scale…
We consider agents in a social network competing to be selected as partners in collaborative, mutually beneficial activities. We study this through a model in which an agent i can initiate a limited number k_i>0 of games and selects the…
We present an exploration of a reputation system based on explicit ratings weighted by the values of corresponding financial transactions from the perspective of its ability to grant "security" to market participants by protecting them from…
A rapidly growing literature on lying in behavioral economics and psychology shows that individuals often do not lie even when lying maximizes their utility. In this work, we attempt to incorporate these findings into the theory of…
The question of \emph{knowledge}, \emph{truth} and \emph{trust} is explored via a mathematical formulation of claims and sources. We define truth as the reproducibly perceived subset of knowledge, formalize sources as having both generative…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
Understanding and resolving cooperation dilemmas are key challenges in evolutionary game theory, which have revealed several mechanisms to address them. This paper investigates the comprehensive influence of multiple reputation-related…
Gossip has been shown to be a relatively efficient solution to problems of cooperation in reputation-based systems of exchange, but many studies don't conceptualize gossiping in a realistic way, often assuming near-perfect information or…
In-game team communication in online multiplayer games has shown the potential to foster efficient collaboration and positive social interactions. Yet players often associate communication within ad hoc teams with frustration and wariness.…
While conventional ranking systems focus solely on maximizing the utility of the ranked items to users, fairness-aware ranking systems additionally try to balance the exposure for different protected attributes such as gender or race. To…
We study players interacting under the veil of ignorance, who have -- coarse -- beliefs represented as subsets of opponents' actions. We analyze when these players follow $\max \min$ or $\max\max$ decision criteria, which we identify with…
We consider crowdsourcing problems where the users are asked to provide evaluations for items; the user evaluations are then used directly, or aggregated into a consensus value. Lacking an incentive scheme, users have no motive in making…
The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism by which individuals cooperate with those who have cooperated with others. This creates a regime in which repeated interactions are not necessary to incent cooperation (as would be required for direct…