Related papers: Saturating stable matchings
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
In this paper, we generalize the notions of perfect matchings, perfect 2-matchings to perfect k-matchings and give a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of perfect k-matchings. For bipartite graphs, we show that this k-matching…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
We show that each perfect matching in a bipartite graph $G$ intersects at least half of the perfect matchings in $G$. This result has equivalent formulations in terms of the permanent of the adjacency matrix of a graph, and in terms of…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
The topic of stable matchings (marriages) in a bipartite graph has become widely popular, starting with the appearance of the classical work by Gale and Shapley. We give a detailed survey on selected known results in this field that…
We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…
Focusing on the bipartite Stable Marriage problem, we investigate different robustness measures related to stable matchings. We analyze the computational complexity of computing them and analyze their behavior in extensive experiments on…
We explore novel connections between antimatroids and matchings in bipartite graphs. In particular, we prove that a combinatorial structure induced by stable matchings or maximum-weight matchings is an antimatroid. Moreover, we demonstrate…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…
In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
We study the graphs formed from instances of the stable matching problem by connecting pairs of elements with an edge when there exists a stable matching in which they are matched. Our results include the NP-completeness of recognizing…
We consider a model of stable edge sets (``matchings'') in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ in which the preferences for vertices of one side (``firms'') are given via choice functions subject to standard axioms of consistency, substitutability…
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
The structural balance of a signed graph is known to be necessary and sufficient to obtain a bipartite consensus among agents with friend-foe relationships. In the real world, relationships are multifarious, and the coexistence of different…
In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…