Related papers: Kuhn Poker with Cheating and Its Detection
Kuhn's Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrate the limits…
In Texas hold'em, after an all-in bet is made and called before the flop, the turn, or the river, the two players sometimes agree to run it $n$ times, meaning that the remaining five, two, or one cards are dealt out not just once but $n$…
In the game of poker, being unpredictable, or bluffing, is an essential skill. When humans play poker, they bluff. However, most works on computer-poker focus on performance metrics such as win rates, while bluffing is overlooked. In this…
Cheating in chess, by using advice from powerful software, has become a major problem, reaching the highest levels. As opposed to the large majority of previous work, which concerned {\em detection} of cheating, here we try to evaluate the…
We present a couple of adaptive learning models of poker-like games, by means of which we show how bluffing strategies emerge very naturally, and can also be rational and evolutively stable. Despite their very simple learning algorithms,…
Artificial intelligence has seen several breakthroughs in recent years, with games often serving as milestones. A common feature of these games is that players have perfect information. Poker is the quintessential game of imperfect…
This paper studies correlations among independently administered hypothetical tests of a simple interactive type, and demonstrates that correlations arising in quantum information theoretic variants of these tests can exhibit a striking…
We investigate a multi-player and multi-choice quantum game. We start from two-player and two-choice game and the result is better than its classical version. Then we extend it to N-player and N-choice cases. In the quantum domain, we…
In an investigation of the applications of Combinatorial Game Theory to chess, we construct novel mutual Zugzwang positions, explain an otherwise mysterious pawn endgame from "A Guide to Chess Endings" (Euwe and Hooper), show positions…
In imperfect-information games, subgame solving is significantly more challenging than in perfect-information games, but in the last few years, such techniques have been developed. They were the key ingredient to the milestone of superhuman…
In imperfect information games (e.g. Bridge, Skat, Poker), one of the fundamental considerations is to infer the missing information while at the same time avoiding the disclosure of private information. Disregarding the issue of protecting…
Is litigation a serious search for truth or simply a game of skill or luck? Although the process of litigation has been modeled as a Prisoner's Dilemma, as a War of Attrition, as a Game of Chicken and even as a simple coin toss, no one has…
For years, the discourse around poker AI has been dominated by the concept of solvers and the pursuit of unexploitable, machine-perfect play. This paper challenges that orthodoxy. It presents Patrick, an AI built on the contrary philosophy:…
We present here the new insight or revisiting the algorithm for playing in Chess with incomplete information (which can be recognized by its newly short-name as Phoenix-Chess strategy). The only difference with respect to the classical…
Quantitative measures of randomness in games are useful for game design and have implications for gambling law. We treat the outcome of a game as a random variable and derive a closed-form expression and estimator for the variance in the…
Algorithms for equilibrium computation generally make no attempt to ensure that the computed strategies are understandable by humans. For instance the strategies for the strongest poker agents are represented as massive binary files. In…
We carry out a game-theoretic analysis of the recursive game "Guts," a variant of poker featuring repeated play with possibly growing stakes. An interesting aspect of such games is the need to account for funds lost to all players if…
We introduce a variant of the classic poker game blackjack -- the continuous blackjack. We study the Nash Equilibrium as well as the case where players deviate from it. We then pivot to the study of a large class of adaptive strategies and…
We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. We prove that if a game of the extensive form with unawareness has perfect recall, then for each mixed strategy there is an equivalent behavior strategy. We show that…
Strategic agents in incomplete-information environments have a conflicted relationship with uncertainty: it can keep them unpredictable to their opponents, but it must also be overcome to predict the actions of those opponents. We use a…