Related papers: Evolution of Risk-Taking Behaviour and Status Pref…

In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies…

Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated,…

This paper studies the equilibrium consumption under external habit formation in a large population of agents. We first formulate problems under two types of conventional habit formation preferences, namely linear and multiplicative…

For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are…

Humans do not always make rational choices, a fact that experimental economics is putting on solid grounds. The social context plays an important role in determining our actions, and often we imitate friends or acquaintances without any…

A quantum game can be viewed as a state preparation in which the final output state results from the competing preferences of the players over the set of possible output states that can be produced. It is therefore possible to view state…

The behaviour of individuals is a main actor in the control of the spread of a communicable disease and, in turn, the spread of an infectious disease can trigger behavioural changes in a population. Here, we study the emergence of the…

Consequential decision-making typically incentivizes individuals to behave strategically, tailoring their behavior to the specifics of the decision rule. A long line of work has therefore sought to counteract strategic behavior by designing…

In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation…

Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what individuals wish to maximize. A natural objective is one's own…

Cooperation is an important research object in economics, sociology, and biology, and the evolution of cooperation in structured populations is a interesting research topic. We mainly focus on the evolution of cooperation with two-order and…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…

In games of friendship links and behaviors, I propose $k$-player Nash stability---a family of equilibria, indexed by a measure of robustness given by the number of permitted link changes, which is (ordinally and cardinally) ranked in a…

Side preference is a critical behavior in conflict handling, and here the behavior is investigated with pedestrian trajectories in circle antipode experiments that own both conflicting and symmetrical participant situations. In the series…

In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…

We investigate how individuals form expectations about population behavior using statistical inference based on observations of their social relations. Misperceptions about others' connectedness and behavior arise from sampling bias…

Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means…

Heterogeneity has been studied as one of the most common explanations of the puzzle of cooperation in social dilemmas. A large number of papers have been published discussing the effects of increasing heterogeneity in structured populations…

Understanding the emergence and sustainability of cooperation is a fundamental problem in evolutionary biology and is frequently studied by the framework of evolutionary game theory. A very powerful mechanism to promote cooperation is…

We consider a class of games that are generalizations of the minority game, in that the demand and supply of the resource are specified independently. This allows us to study systems in which agents compete under different demand loads.…