Related papers: Detector blinding attacks on counterfactual quantu…
We propose and experimentally demonstrate a scheme to render the detection apparatus of a Quantum Key Distribution system immune to the main classes of hacking attacks in which the eavesdropper explores the back-door opened by the…
We present an active anti-latching system for superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors. We experimentally test it against a bright-light attack, previously used to compromise security of quantum key distribution. Although our system…
Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) have been shown to be subject to various detector side-channel attacks that compromise the promised unconditional security. Most notable is a general class of attacks adopting the…
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the laws of physics. So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations always rely…
We propose a double blinding-attack on entangled-based quantum key distribution protocols. The principle of the attack is the same as in existing blinding attack except that instead of blinding the detectors on one side only, Eve is…
We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only successful if a…
The information theoretic security promised by quantum key distribution (QKD) holds as long as the assumptions in the theoretical model match the parameters in the physical implementation. The superlinear behaviour of sensitive…
Quantum cryptography allows one to distribute a secret key between two remote parties using the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics. The well-known established paradigm for the quantum key distribution relies on the actual…
Quantum Key Distribution with the BB84 protocol has been shown to be unconditionally secure even using weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon signals. The distances that can be covered by these methods are limited due to the loss in…
Several attacks have been proposed on quantum key distribution systems with gated single-photon detectors. The attacks involve triggering the detectors outside the center of the detector gate, and/or using bright illumination to exploit…
Imperfect devices in commercial quantum key distribution systems open security loopholes that an eavesdropper may exploit. An example of one such imperfection is the wavelength dependent coupling ratio of the fiber beam splitter. Utilizing…
In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD). Implementable countermeasures are proposed to patch the discovered loopholes. However,…
We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be…
The security proofs of continuous-variable quantum key distribution are based on the assumptions that the eavesdropper can neither act on the local oscillator nor control Bob's beam splitter. These assumptions may be invalid in practice due…
Detection-efficiency mismatch is a common problem in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Current security proofs of QKD with detection-efficiency mismatch rely either on the assumption of the single-photon light source on the…
Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and…
Counterfactual quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two parties to share a secret key using an interaction-free measurement. Here, we point out that the efficiency of counterfactual QKD protocols can be enhanced by including…
Based on the fundamental rules of quantum mechanics, two communicating parties can generate and share a secret random key that can be used to encrypt and decrypt messages sent over an insecure channel. This process is known as quantum key…
We investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocols that use pulsed coherent light. In particular, we analyze two sequential attacks based on unambiguous…
Quantum cryptography or, more precisely, quantum key distribution (QKD), is one of the advanced areas in the field of quantum technologies. The confidentiality of keys distributed with the use of QKD protocols is guaranteed by the…