Related papers: Constrained-Order Prophet Inequalities
In this article, I will present a paradox whose purpose is to draw your attention to an important topic in finance, concerning the non-independence of the financial returns (non-ergodic hypothesis). In this paradox, we have two people…
We consider {\em bidding games}, a class of two-player zero-sum {\em graph games}. The game proceeds as follows. Both players have bounded budgets. A token is placed on a vertex of a graph, in each turn the players simultaneously submit…
Several resource allocation settings involve agents with unequal entitlements represented by weights. We analyze weighted fair division from an asymptotic perspective: if $m$ items are divided among $n$ agents whose utilities are…
Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…
Transformers used for evidence-grounded question answering with binary adjudication (e.g., support/refute or yes/no) can be highly sensitive to the order in which exchangeable evidence is presented, producing dispersion across permutations…
A gambler moves between the vertices $1, \ldots, n$ of a graph using the probability distribution $p_{1}, \ldots, p_{n}$. Multiple cops pursue the gambler on the graph, only being able to move between adjacent vertices. We investigate the…
We initiate the study of incentive-compatible forecasting competitions in which multiple forecasters make predictions about one or more events and compete for a single prize. We have two objectives: (1) to incentivize forecasters to report…
We study a class of Bayesian online selection problems with matroid constraints. Consider a vendor who has several items to sell, with the set of sold items being subject to some structural constraints, e.g., the set of sold items should be…
All proper scoring rules incentivize an expert to predict \emph{accurately} (report their true estimate), but not all proper scoring rules equally incentivize \emph{precision}. Rather than treating the expert's belief as exogenously given,…
Corresponding to $n$ independent non-negative random variables $X_1,...,X_n$, are values $M_1,...,M_n$, where each $M_i$ is the expected value of the maximum of $n$ independent copies of $X_i$. We obtain an upper bound to the expected value…
We consider a game with two players, consisting of a number of rounds, where the first player to win $n$ rounds becomes the overall winner. Who wins each individual round is governed by a certain urn having two types of balls (type 1 and…
We consider Online Minimum Bipartite Matching under the uniform metric. We show that Randomized Greedy achieves a competitive ratio equal to $(1+1/n) (H_{n+1}-1)$, which matches the lower bound. Comparing with the fact that RG achieves an…
We study the classic bilateral trade setting. Myerson and Satterthwaite show that there is no Bayesian incentive compatible and budget-balanced mechanism that obtains the gains from trade of the first-best mechanism. Consider the…
In this paper we provide formulas for the expectation of a conditional game duration in a finite state-space one-dimensional gambler's ruin problem with arbitrary winning $p(n)$ and losing $q(n)$ probabilities (i.e., they depend on the…
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…
We study the distribution P(\omega) of the random variable \omega = x_1/(x_1 + x_2), where x_1 and x_2 are the wealths of two individuals selected at random from the same tempered Paretian ensemble characterized by the distribution \Psi(x)…
This paper studies the fundamental limits of availability and throughput for independent and heterogeneous demands of a limited resource. Availability is the probability that the demands are below the capacity of the resource. Throughput is…
We study the problem of designing consistent sequential two-sample tests in a nonparametric setting. Guided by the principle of testing by betting, we reframe this task into that of selecting a sequence of payoff functions that maximize the…
We derive two conditional expectation bounds, which we use to simplify cryptographic security proofs. The first bound relates the expectation of a bounded random variable and the average of its conditional expectations with respect to a set…
We study social choice rules under the utilitarian distortion framework, with an additional metric assumption on the agents' costs over the alternatives. In this approach, these costs are given by an underlying metric on the set of all…