Related papers: A Model of Choice with Minimal Compromise
We propose and axiomatize a new model of incomplete preferences under uncertainty, which we call \textit{hope-and-prepare preferences}. An act is considered more desirable than an other act when, and only when, both an optimistic…
Users' interactions with recommender systems often involve more than simple acceptance or rejection. We highlight two overlooked states: hesitation, when people deliberate without certainty, and tolerance, when this hesitation escalates…
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…
We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…
We study the problem of fair sequential decision making given voter preferences. In each round, a decision rule must choose a decision from a set of alternatives where each voter reports which of these alternatives they approve. Instead of…
We study a screening problem in which an agent privately observes a set of feasible technologies and can strategically disclose only a subset to the principal. The principal then takes an action whose payoff consequences for both players…
We consider two-stage robust optimization problems, which can be seen as games between a decision maker and an adversary. After the decision maker fixes part of the solution, the adversary chooses a scenario from a specified uncertainty…
Preference elicitation explicitly asks users what kind of recommendations they would like to receive. It is a popular technique for conversational recommender systems to deal with cold-starts. Previous work has studied selection bias in…
To effectively assist human workers in assembly tasks a robot must proactively offer support by inferring their preferences in sequencing the task actions. Previous work has focused on learning the dominant preferences of human workers for…
Humans have come to rely on machines for reducing excessive information to manageable representations. But this reliance can be abused -- strategic machines might craft representations that manipulate their users. How can a user make good…
Plurality and approval voting are two well-known voting systems with different strengths and weaknesses. In this paper we consider a new voting system we call beta(k) which allows voters to select a single first-choice candidate and approve…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
Recent work has considered theoretical models for the behavior of agents with specific behavioral biases: rather than making decisions that optimize a given payoff function, the agent behaves inefficiently because its decisions suffer from…
This paper studies delegation in a model of discrete choice. In the delegation problem, an uninformed principal must consult an informed agent to make a decision. Both the agent and principal have preferences over the decided-upon action…
Researchers in psychology characterize decision-making as a process of eliminating options. While statistical modelling typically focuses on the eventual choice, we analyze consideration sets describing, for each survey participant, all…
Suppose we are given a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set. The set is considered as a set of alternatives (say candidates for an office) and the functions as potential "voters". The question is, what choice…
In many choice problems, the interaction between several distinct variables determines the payoff of each alternative. I propose and axiomatize a model of a decision maker who recognizes that she may not accurately perceive the correlation…
We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…
Let $X_n,...,X_1$ be i.i.d. random variables with distribution function $F$. A statistician, knowing $F$, observes the $X$ values sequentially and is given two chances to choose $X$'s using stopping rules. The statistician's goal is to stop…
We consider decision-making and game scenarios in which an agent is limited by his/her computational ability to foresee all the available moves towards the future - that is, we study scenarios with short sight. We focus on how short sight…