Related papers: A Model of Choice with Minimal Compromise
The way that people make choices or exhibit preferences can be strongly affected by the set of available alternatives, often called the choice set. Furthermore, there are usually heterogeneous preferences, either at an individual level…
In the theory of voting, the Plurality rule for preferences that come in the form of linear orders selects the alternatives most frequently appearing in the first position of those orders, while the Anti-Plurality rule selects the…
We study how linear orders can be employed to realise choice functions for which the set of potential choices is restricted, i.e., the possible choice is not possible among the full powerset of all alternatives. In such restricted settings,…
In many situations, the decision maker observes items in sequence and needs to determine whether or not to retain a particular item immediately after it is observed. Any decision rule creates a set of items that are selected. We consider…
Two-stage superposition choice procedures, which sequentially apply two choice procedures so that the result of the first choice procedure is the input for the second choice procedure, are studied. We define which of them satisfy given…
Shortlisting is the task of reducing a long list of alternatives to a (smaller) set of best or most suitable alternatives. Shortlisting is often used in the nomination process of awards or in recommender systems to display featured objects.…
Altruistic behaviour is disadvantageous for the individual while is advantageous for its group. If the target of the selection is the individual, one would expect the selection process to lead to populations formed by wholly homogeneous…
Eliciting a preference model involves asking a person, named decision-maker, a series of questions. We assume that these preferences can be represented by an additive value function. In this work, we query simultaneously two decision-makers…
Several rules for social choice are examined from a unifying point of view that looks at them as procedures for revising a system of degrees of belief in accordance with certain specified logical constraints. Belief is here a social…
Consider an agent taking two successive decisions to maximize his expected utility under uncertainty. After his first decision, a signal is revealed that provides information about the state of nature. The observation of the signal allows…
We consider a setting where $n$ buyers, with combinatorial preferences over $m$ items, and a seller, running a priority-based allocation mechanism, repeatedly interact. Our goal, from observing limited information about the results of these…
Revealed preference theory studies the possibility of modeling an agent's revealed preferences and the construction of a consistent utility function. However, modeling agent's choices over preference orderings is not always practical and…
A set of agents has to make a decision about the provision of a public good and its financing. Agents have heterogeneous values for the public good and each agent's value is private information. An agenda-setter has the right to make a…
We introduce an Attention Overload Model that captures the idea that alternatives compete for the decision maker's attention, and hence the attention that each alternative receives decreases as the choice problem becomes larger. Using this…
Decision making can be difficult when there are many actors (or agents) who may be coordinating or competing to achieve their various ideas of the optimum outcome. Here I present a simple decision making model with an explicitly…
Applications of machine learning inform human decision makers in a broad range of tasks. The resulting problem is usually formulated in terms of a single decision maker. We argue that it should rather be described as a two-player learning…
In the theory of social choice the research is focused around the projection of individual preference orders to the social preference order. Also, the justification of the preference order formalism begins with the concept of utility i.e.…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
A decision maker repeatedly chooses one of a finite set of actions. In each period, the decision maker's payoff depends on fixed basic payoff of the chosen action and the frequency with which the action has been chosen in the past. We…
We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice,…