Related papers: Ambiguous Persuasion: An Ex-Ante Formulation
Mutual relationships, such as cooperation and exploitation, are the basis of human and other biological societies. The foundations of these relationships are rooted in the decision making of individuals, and whether they choose to be…
We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…
Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…
Applications of machine learning inform human decision makers in a broad range of tasks. The resulting problem is usually formulated in terms of a single decision maker. We argue that it should rather be described as a two-player learning…
A principal delegates decisions to a biased agent. Payoffs depend on a state that the principal cannot observe. Initially, the agent does not observe the state, but he can acquire information about it at a cost. We characterize the…
How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the persuader employs a mechanism to first elicit the agent's…
This paper studies the advance-purchase game when a consumer has belief-based loss-averse preferences, introducing a novel perspective by incorporating reference updating. It demonstrates that loss aversion increases the consumer's…
Currently the Dempster-Shafer based algorithm and Uniform Random Probability based algorithm are the preferred method of resolving security games, in which defenders are able to identify attackers and only strategy remained ambiguous.…
I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…
We derive robust predictions in games involving flexible information acquisition, also known as rational inattention (Sims 2003). These predictions remain accurate regardless of the specific methods players employ to gather information.…
Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…
Standard models of multi-agent modal logic do not capture the fact that information is often \emph{ambiguous}, and may be interpreted in different ways by different agents. We propose a framework that can model this, and consider different…
We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative information regarding the behaviour of a previous participant in a dictator game with a taking option. We use the strategy method to identify…
We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This problem generalizes the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework and…
A sender communicates private information about a hidden state to a receiver who seeks to match his action to that state. The sender strives to appear informed at the receiver's expense. I characterize informative equilibria under a broad…
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the…
Open-textured terms in written rules are typically settled through interpretive argumentation. Ongoing work has attempted to catalogue the schemes used in such interpretive argumentation. But how can the use of these schemes affect the way…
We conduct an incentivized experiment on a nationally representative US sample \\ (N=708) to test whether people prefer to avoid ambiguity even when it means choosing dominated options. In contrast to the literature, we find that 55\% of…
This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…
We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if…