Related papers: A Matroid Generalization of the Super-Stable Match…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…
The dynamical behavior of switched affine systems is known to be more intricate than that of the well-studied switched linear systems, essentially due to the existence of distinct equilibrium points for each subsystem. First, under…
There has been a recent interest in imitation learning methods that are guaranteed to produce a stabilizing control law with respect to a known system. Work in this area has generally considered linear systems and controllers, for which…
Consider a cyclically ordered collection of $r$ equinumerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union…
This work presents a hybrid approach to solve the maximum stable set problem, using constraint and semidefinite programming. The approach consists of two steps: subproblem generation and subproblem solution. First we rank the variable…
Stable matching in a community consisting of $N$ men and $N$ women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and…
We consider popular matching problems in both bipartite and non-bipartite graphs with strict preference lists. It is known that every stable matching is a min-size popular matching. A subclass of max-size popular matchings called dominant…
The popular matching problem is of matching a set of applicants to a set of posts, where each applicant has a preference list, ranking a non-empty subset of posts in the order of preference, possibly with ties. A matching M is popular if…
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test…
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the…
Estimation of density functions supported on general domains arises when the data is naturally restricted to a proper subset of the real space. This problem is complicated by typically intractable normalizing constants. Score matching…
This paper deals with simultaneously fast and in-place algorithms for formulae where the result has to be linearly accumulated: some of the output variables are also input variables, linked by a linear dependency. Fundamental examples…
This paper gives an overview on and summarizes existing complexity and algorithmic results of some variants of the Stable Marriage and the Stable Roommates problems. The last section defines a list of stable matching problems mentioned in…
The index coding problem has been generalized recently to accommodate receivers which demand functions of messages and which possess functions of messages. The connections between index coding and matroid theory have been well studied in…
We develop a combinatorial approach to the study of semigroups and monoids with finite presentations satisfying small overlap conditions. In contrast to existing geometric methods, our approach facilitates a sequential left-right analysis…
In domains where users tend to develop long-term preferences that do not change too frequently, the stability of recommendations is an important factor of the perceived quality of a recommender system. In such cases, unstable…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
We consider the popular matching problem in a roommates instance with strict preference lists. While popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, they need not exist in a roommates instance. The complexity of the popular matching…
The classical linear ordering problem seeks a single ranking representing a given preference matrix. While suitable for homogeneous populations, it fails when observed preferences arise from several latent groups with distinct ranking…