Related papers: AHEAD : Ad-Hoc Electronic Auction Design
Among the existing E-Commerce applications, online auctions are the most influential ones. Their impact on trading in the B2B (business to business) as well as in the B2C (business to consumer) and C2C (consumer to consumer) areas will be…
Motivated by sponsored search auctions, we study multi-unit auctions with budget constraints. In the mechanism we propose, Sort-Cut, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since Sort-Cut's revenue is increasing in budgets and…
Federated learning makes it possible for all parties with data isolation to train the model collaboratively and efficiently while satisfying privacy protection. To obtain a high-quality model, an incentive mechanism is necessary to motivate…
This work is concerned with the application of game theoretic principles to model competition between demand response aggregators for selling excess energy stored in electrochemical storage devices directly to other aggregators in a power…
In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a ``fund…
This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential auctions, simultaneous auctions, and the Trading Agent…
We study multi-unit auctions in which bidders have limited knowledge of opponent strategies and values. We characterize optimal prior-free bids; these bids minimize the maximal loss in expected utility resulting from uncertainty surrounding…
High-frequency trading, in both traditional and decentralized markets, induces latency races and redundant order flow as traders spend resources to win time-sensitive opportunities. We show that auctioning artificial time priority can…
We study the pay-as-bid auction game, a supply function model with discriminatory pricing and asymmetric firms. In this game, strategies are non-decreasing supply functions relating pric to quantity and the exact choice of the strategy…
Interference between treated and untreated units is a source of bias in marketplace experiments. In this paper, we specifically consider pricing interventions, in which a platform seeks to adjust base pricing levels at the marketplace level…
A prevalent assumption in auction theory is that the auctioneer has full control over the market and that the allocation she dictates is final. In practice, however, agents might be able to resell acquired items in an aftermarket. A…
This paper extends the incomplete model of Haile and Tamer (2003) from static English auctions to sequential English auctions. Because bidders may wait for future opportunities, the static condition that bidders do not let rivals win at…
Algorithms increasingly automate bidding in online auctions, raising concerns about tacit bid suppression and revenue shortfalls. Prior work identifies individual mechanisms behind algorithmic bid suppression, but it remains unclear which…
In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…
We present a model of digital advertising with three key features: (i) advertisers can reach consumers on and off a platform, (ii) additional data enhances the value of advertiser-consumer matches, and (iii) bidding follows auction-like…
The system operator's scheduling problem in electricity markets, called unit commitment, is a non-convex mixed-integer program. The optimal value function is non-convex, preventing the application of traditional marginal pricing theory to…
We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…
This paper studies the use of a multi-attribute auction in a communication system to bring about efficient relaying in a non-cooperative setting. We consider a system where a source seeks to offload data to an access point (AP) while…
This paper designs a market platform for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading in Transactive Energy (TE) systems, where prosumers and consumers actively participate in the market as seller or buyer to trade energy. An auction-based approach is…
We study procurement auctions, where an auctioneer seeks to acquire services from strategic sellers with private costs. The quality of services is measured by a submodular function known to the auctioneer. Our goal is to design…