Related papers: AHEAD : Ad-Hoc Electronic Auction Design
We consider a non-stochastic online learning approach to price financial options by modeling the market dynamic as a repeated game between the nature (adversary) and the investor. We demonstrate that such framework yields analogous…
We study blockchain trade-intent auctions, which currently intermediate about USD 10 billion in trades each month. These auctions are combinatorial because executing multiple trade intents jointly generates additional efficiencies. However,…
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…
In diffusion auctions, sellers can leverage an underlying social network to broaden participation, thereby increasing their potential revenue. Specifically, sellers can incentivise participants in their auction to diffuse information about…
The first-price auction is popular in practice for its simplicity and transparency. Moreover, its potential virtues grow in complex settings where incentive compatible auctions may generate little or no revenue. Unfortunately, the…
We study a recommendation system where sellers compete for visibility by strategically offering commissions to a platform that optimally curates a ranked menu of items and their respective prices for each customer. Customers interact…
Automated bidding, an emerging intelligent decision making paradigm powered by machine learning, has become popular in online advertising. Advertisers in automated bidding evaluate the cumulative utilities and have private financial…
Electricity markets differ in their ability to meet power imbalances in short notice in a controlled fashion. Relatively flexible markets have the ability to ramp up (or down) power flows across interties without compromising their ability…
Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mechanism--the fixed-price mechanism. Unlike the standard…
We investigate a type of emerging user-assisted mobile applications or services, referred to as Dynamic Mobile Ad-hoc Crowd Service (DMACS), such as collaborative streaming via smartphones or location privacy protection through a crowd of…
The design of optimal auctions is a problem of interest in economics, game theory and computer science. Despite decades of effort, strategyproof, revenue-maximizing auction designs are still not known outside of restricted settings.…
In recent years, Header Bidding (HB) has gained popularity among web publishers, challenging the status quo in the ad ecosystem. Contrary to the traditional waterfall standard, HB aims to give back to publishers control of their ad…
We introduce a new methodology that enables detection of the onset of convergence towards Nash equilibria in simple repeated games with infinitely large strategy spaces, thereby revealing the heuristics used in decision-making. The method…
We study equilibria in two-buyer sequential second-price (or first-price) auctions for identical goods. Buyers have weakly decreasing incremental values, and we make a behavioural no-overbidding assumption: the buyers do not bid above their…
The success of online auctions has given buyers access to greater product diversity with potentially lower prices. It has provided sellers with access to large numbers of potential buyers and reduced transaction costs by enabling auctions…
As computational agents are developed for increasingly complicated e-commerce applications, the complexity of the decisions they face demands advances in artificial intelligence techniques. For example, an agent representing a seller in an…
We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given budget. This paper studies the market design problem in such…
We study actual bidding behavior when a new auction format gets introduced into the marketplace. More specifically, we investigate this question using a novel dataset on internet display advertising auctions that exploits a staggered…
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when bidders have independent subjective prior beliefs about the…
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive…