Related papers: Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomo…
Designing fair algorithmic decision systems requires balancing model performance with fairness toward affected individuals: More fairness might require sacrificing some performance and vice versa, yet the space of possible trade-offs is…
We study the problem of continuous object dissemination---given a large number of users and continuously arriving new objects, deliver an object to all users who prefer the object. Many real world applications analyze users' preferences for…
The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) states that for bilateral trade, there is no mechanism that is individually rational (IR), incentive compatible (IC), weakly budget balanced, and efficient. This has led…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
In fair division, equitability dictates that each participant receives the same level of utility. In this work, we study equitable allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. While prior work has studied…
The design of optimal auctions is a problem of interest in economics, game theory and computer science. Despite decades of effort, strategyproof, revenue-maximizing auction designs are still not known outside of restricted settings.…
The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider the problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with…
We study the combinatorial contracting problem of D\"utting et al. [FOCS '21], in which a principal seeks to incentivize an agent to take a set of costly actions. In their model, there is a binary outcome (the agent can succeed or fail),…
We present a novel bilateral negotiation model that allows a self-interested agent to learn how to negotiate over multiple issues in the presence of user preference uncertainty. The model relies upon interpretable strategy templates…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the \emph{balanced…
We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random priority (MRP) as extensions of the well known PS and RP mechanisms to the multi-type resource allocation problem (MTRA) with partial preferences. In our setting, there…
We study how to maximize the broker's (expected) profit in a two-sided market, where she buys items from a set of sellers and resells them to a set of buyers. Each seller has a single item to sell and holds a private value on her item, and…
In practice, most mechanisms for selling, buying, matching, voting, and so on are not incentive compatible. We present techniques for estimating how far a mechanism is from incentive compatible. Given samples from the agents' type…
We study the classical problem of matching $n$ agents to $n$ objects, where the agents have ranked preferences over the objects. We focus on two popular desiderata from the matching literature: Pareto optimality and rank-maximality. Instead…
We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible items among $n$ agents. Envy-free allocations, in which each agent prefers her bundle to the bundle of every other agent, need not exist in the worst case. However, when agents have…
We study the strong core of housing markets when agents' preferences over houses are expressed as partial orders. We provide a structural characterization of the strong core, and propose an efficient algorithm that finds an allocation in…
Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism. For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve price, and the appropriate reserve price depends on how much the…
Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial…
It is challenging to quantify numerical preferences for different objectives in a multi-objective decision-making problem. However, the demonstrations of a user are often accessible. We propose an algorithm to infer linear preference…
Given a set of $n$ individuals with strict preferences over $m$ indivisible objects, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism is a method for allocating objects to individuals in a way that is efficient, fair, and…