Related papers: Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location wi…
We address the problem of locating facilities on the $[0,1]$ interval based on reports from strategic agents. The cost of each agent is her distance to the closest facility, and the global objective is to minimize either the maximum cost of…
This paper investigates mechanism design for congested facility location problems, where agents are partitioned into groups with conflicting interests (e.g., competition for booking a basketball court in a gymnasium), and each agent's cost…
We focus on the problem of placing two facilities along a linear space to serve a group of agents. Each agent is committed to minimizing the distance between her location and the closest facility. A mechanism is an algorithm that maps the…
We consider a truthful facility location problem with agents that have private positions on the line of real numbers and known optional preferences over two obnoxious facilities that must be placed at locations chosen from a given set of…
We initiate the study of the capacity constrained facility location problem from a mechanism design perspective. The capacity constrained setting leads to a new strategic environment where a facility serves a subset of the population, which…
In the strategic facility location problem, a set of agents report their locations in a metric space and the goal is to use these reports to open a new facility, minimizing an aggregate distance measure from the agents to the facility.…
We consider a problem where agents have private positions on a line, and public approval preferences over two facilities, and their cost is the maximum distance from their approved facilities. The goal is to decide the facility locations to…
Location Routing is a fundamental planning problem in logistics, in which strategic location decisions on the placement of facilities (depots, distribution centers, warehouses etc.) are taken based on accurate estimates of operational…
In the facility location problem, the task is to place one or more facilities so as to minimize the sum of the agent costs for accessing their nearest facility. Heretofore, in the strategic version, agent locations have been assumed to be…
We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal preferences. In such a setting, we have a set of agents and a set of facilities. Each agent is located on a line and has an ordinal preference over the facilities. Our goal…
We study the distributed facility location games with candidate locations, where agents on a line are partitioned into groups. Both desirable and obnoxious facility location settings are discussed. In distributed location problems,…
In this paper the capacitated hub location problem is formulated by a minimax regret model, which takes into account uncertain setup cost and demand. We focus on hub location with multiple allocations as a strategic problem requiring one…
We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results…
We study a truthful two-facility location problem in which a set of agents have private positions on the line of real numbers and known approval preferences over two different facilities. Given the locations of the two facilities, the cost…
We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness…
The metric capacitated facility location is a well-studied problem for which, while constant factor approximations are known, no efficient relaxation with constant integrality gap is known. The question whether there is such a relaxation is…
We study the problem of locating a single obnoxious facility on the normalized line segment $[0,1]$ with strategic agents from a mechanism design perspective. Each agent has a preference for the undesirable location of the facility and…
We take the classic facility location problem and consider a variation, in which each agent's individual cost function is equal to their distance from the facility multiplied by a scaling factor which is determined by the facility…
The facility location problem is a well-known challenge in logistics that is proven to be NP-hard. In this paper we specifically simulate the geographical placement of facilities to provide adequate service to customers. Determining…
The facility location with strategic agents is a canonical problem in the literature on mechanism design without money. Recently, Agrawal et. al. considered this problem in the context of machine learning augmented algorithms, where the…