Related papers: Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location in…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among strategic agents. We focus on settings wherein monetary transfers are not available and each agent's private valuation is a submodular function with binary marginals, i.e., the…
As the frontier of machine learning applications moves further into human interaction, multiple concerns arise regarding automated decision-making. Two of the most critical issues are fairness and data privacy. On the one hand, one must…
In this paper, we study of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem ($m$-CFLP) on the line from a Bayesian Mechanism Design perspective and propose a novel class of mechanisms: the \textit{Extended Ranking Mechanisms} (ERMs). We first…
We study the object reallocation problem under strict preferences. On the unrestricted domain, Ekici (2024) showed that the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is the unique mechanism that is individually rational, pair efficient, and…
In this paper we study the uncapacitated facility location problem in the model of differential privacy (DP) with uniform facility cost. Specifically, we first show that, under the hierarchically well-separated tree (HST) metrics and the…
We consider the following problem - a group of mobile agents perform some task on a terrain modeled as a graph. In a given moment of time an adversary gets an access to the graph and positions of the agents. Shortly before adversary's…
We study a participatory budgeting problem, where a set of strategic agents wish to split a divisible budget among different projects, by aggregating their proposals on a single division. Unfortunately, the straight-forward rule that…
This paper studies the problem of minimizing group-level inequity in facility location games on the real line, where agents belong to different groups and may act strategically. We explore a fairness-oriented objective that minimizes the…
The facility location game has been studied extensively in mechanism design. In the classical model, each agent's cost is solely determined by her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we introduce a novel model where each…
We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…
Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…
Path-aware networking architectures like SCION provide end-hosts with explicit control over inter-domain routing, while multipath transport protocols like MPTCP and MPQUIC enable the concurrent use of multiple paths. This combination…
In this paper we propose an annealing based framework to incorporate inequality constraints in optimization problems such as facility location, simultaneous facility location with path optimization, and the last mile delivery problem. These…
Metric search is concerned with the efficient evaluation of queries in metric spaces. In general,a large space of objects is arranged in such a way that, when a further object is presented as a query, those objects most similar to the query…
This paper studies algorithmic fairness when the protected attribute is location. To handle protected attributes that are continuous, such as age or income, the standard approach is to discretize the domain into predefined groups, and…
In this paper, we investigate tradeoffs among differential privacy (DP) and several important voting axioms: Pareto efficiency, SD-efficiency, PC-efficiency, Condorcet consistency, and Condorcet loser criterion. We provide upper and lower…
Several resource allocation problems involve multiple types of resources, with a different agency being responsible for "locally" allocating the resources of each type, while a central planner wishes to provide a guarantee on the properties…
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…
We derive the optimal $\epsilon$-differentially private mechanism for single real-valued query function under a very general utility-maximization (or cost-minimization) framework. The class of noise probability distributions in the optimal…